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Recent popular publications have emphasised the brutality and suffering inflicted upon 
African communities at the onset of colonialism in the Congo, under the Belgium King 
Leopold II. Yet this Euro-centric approach works to obscure African agency and 
collaboration under the Congo Free State, and the dependency of the Free State officers 
upon their African partners. Through following the trajectory of the Zappo-Zap, a distinctly 
under-studied slaving ethnic group who migrated to the western Kasai region, this 
dissertation makes a headway into understanding that the violence of the Congo Free State 
was fabricated from existing modes of exploitation in the Congo prior to European 
penetration, such as the Arab-Swahili commercial empires. Notably loyal, the example of 
the Zappo-Zap serves to evaluate the role of African agents in the shaping of exploitative 
Free State policies, and elucidates the extent that the Zappo-Zap adapted to, and gained 
from, the reliance of the Free State on them, in the midst of numerous rebellions in the 
Kasai such as the infamous Luluabourg Revolt. 
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Map 1. 'Central Africa in the nineteenth century' in David Birmingham, Central Africa to 1870: Zambezia, 














Scholarly interest in the Congo shows no sign of abating. This interest is driven partly by the 
scale and complexity of the recent conflicts that have plagued the country during what 
some commentators have dubbed ‘Africa’s World War’.1 Yet, however natural and well-
meaning, the outrage generated by the on-going atrocities has not always been conducive 
to objective historical analysis into the roots of the violence. Thus, both in the media and in 
popular publications, the period of Leopoldian and, then, Belgian colonialisms are 
presented as the key to understanding the ‘Congo problem’. In this historical rendering, 
King Leopold II is characterised as a greedy tyrant, despotically ruling the Congo and single-
handedly introducing a brutal policy of the resource extraction which has continued to this 
day.2 To be sure, the exploitative structures that characterized the Congo Free State (CFS), 
particularly at the height of the so-called ‘red rubber’ atrocities, are undeniable. Yet Euro-
centric narratives pander to the romantic ideal of a harmonious and tranquil Africa before 
the arrival of Europeans. 3 As such, they have unduly simplified a much more complex and 
multi-layered history of violence in the region. As Nancy Rose Hunt has stressed, ‘absence 
of historization [sic]’ is the distinguishing trait of the ‘urgent histories’ cobbled together by 
                                                             
1 Gerard Punier Africa’s World War: Congo, the Rwandan Genocide, and the Making of a Continental 
Catastrophe (Oxford University Press: Oxford, 2009). 
2 See, especially, Adam Hochschild’s best-selling King Leopold’s Ghost: A Story of Greed, Terror, and 
Heroism in Colonial Africa (Pan Books: London, 2006); Kevin C. Dunn, Imagining the Congo: the 
International Relations of Identity (Palgrave Macmillan: New York, 2003);  and King Leopold's legacy 
of DR Congo violence, [online], BBC News, last updated 24th February 2004, [cited 15th November 
2014]. Available from <http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/africa/3516965.stm>  
3
 See, on this score, Jan-Bart Gewald, ‘More than Red Rubber and Figures Alone: A Critical Appraisal 
of the Memory of the Congo Exhibition at the Royal Museum for Central Africa, Tervuren, Belgium’, 




international humanitarian campaigners.4 The ‘urgent histories’ of the present, of course, 
echo the ‘urgent histories’ of the past: specifically, the early twentieth-century human 
rights campaign of the Congo Reform Movement headed by E.D. Morel. Taken together, 
old and new media discourses about violence in the Congo have not infrequently 
reinforced what Vansina calls the ‘crass ignorance of the cliché that reduces the colonial 
period to a time of unspeakable atrocities under Leopold II followed by a breakdown into 
utter chaos at independence, which then somehow leads to and explains the failed state of 
the country today.’5 
 
This dissertation seeks to contribute to a better understanding of the history of violence in 
the Congo by stressing the central importance of African initiative to the early 
establishment of the CFS.  Focusing on the trajectory of the Zappo-Zap,6 and following in 
the footsteps of Jean-Luc Vellut and, more recently, Aldwin Roes,7 this thesis argues that 
the politics of the Euro-African encounter in the Kasai – and, by extension, elsewhere in the 
Congo – are poorly served by approaches that portray all Africans as victims of European 
violence and oppression. 
 
While it cannot be denied that European actors were responsible for carrying out acts of 
brutality and for laying the foundations for future waves of violence (not least by 
entrenching principles of racial and ethnic categorisation), the fact remains that the early 
                                                             
4 Nancy Rose Hunt, ‘An Acoustic Register, Tenacious Images, and Congolese Scenes of Rape and 
Repetition’, Cultural Anthropology, Volume 23, Issue 2, (2008), p. 221. 
5 Jan Vansina, Being Colonized: The Kuba Experience in Rural Congo, 1880-1960 (University of 
Wisconsin Press: Madison; Wisconsin, 2010), p. 331. 
6 The ethnonym ‘Zappo-Zap’ seems to have derived from a chief named Nsapu-Nsapu. Nsapu-
Nsapu's heirs adopted the name ‘Zappo-Zap’ for themselves, which was henceforth used to 
encompass the people as a whole. 
7 Jean-Luc Vellut, ‘La violence armée dans l’État indépendant du Congo: ténèbres et clartés dans 
l’histoire d’un État conquérant’, Cultures et développement, Volume 16, Issue 3-4, (1984), p. 671-
707 ; Aldwin Roes, 'Towards a History of Mass Violence in the État Independant du Congo, 1885-




exploitation of the Kasai was never an exclusive European affair. On the contrary: non-
Europeans actors often held the balance of regional power, and it was largely due to the 
stipulation of local alliances that the CFS was able to exist. 
 
Another central argument of this dissertation is that in order to grasp the workings of the 
State and the set of alliances that underpinned it, it is necessary to broaden one’s focus of 
observation so as to encompass nineteenth-century dynamics.  Different from the ancient 
kingdoms of the savanna, the CFS – as will be demonstrated – had more in common with 
the predatory warlord states that had succeeded them in several areas in the second half 
of the nineteenth-century. The workings of both the Arab-Swahili and Ovimbundu ivory 
and slave trades are particularly significant in this regard. Building upon aspects of Melvin 
Page's study8 this dissertation will explore the extent to which the new socio-military forces 
generated by the incorporation of the Kasai region into global networks of trade were  
assimilated into the structures of the Free State.  
 
This approach explains the decision not to refer to the era prior to the imposition of 
European territorial control as 'pre-colonial'. The adjective, although indeed convenient, is 
misleading, as it implies that the arrival of the Europeans coincided with the arrival of 
colonialism itself. Furthermore, the distinction between the 'colonial' and 'pre-colonial' 
eras implies that there was a sharp transfer of power from the Africans to the Europeans. 
This – as this dissertation will show – would be a grossly inaccurate assumption; one that 
would simplify the complex power relationships on the ground between European and 
African agents, especially at the outset of formal European rule.   
 
 
                                                             
8 Melvin E. Page, 'The Manyema Hordes of Tippu Tip: A Case Study in Social Stratification and the 




The Literature on the Kasai  
The literature with an exclusive focus on the Kasai region is sparse. A classic account is van 
Zandijcke’s Pages d’Histoire du Kasayi, still commendable for its thorough discussion of the 
period between the first Euro-African encounter of 1881 and the Luluabourg Revolt of 
1895. Van Zandijcke shows awareness of the activities of eastern Kasaian warlords, 
especially in relation to the subsequent mass migration of Luba-speaking refugees, and 
recognises the role of the Zappo-Zap in passing. Neither of these subjects, however, are the 
focus of in-depth discussions.9 Building upon van Zandijcke’s work, Martens’ PhD thesis is 
perhaps the most comprehensive study of the transition to European rule in the Kasai. 
Martens was granted unrestricted access to the (no longer available) records of the 
Compagnie du Kasaï; because of this, her work is particularly valuable for the insights it 
provides into the economic history of the region and its involvement in international 
trade.10 More recently, Congolese  historian Mwana Mputu has attempted a similar feat. 
The value of his monograph, however, is marred by poor referencing and the ensuing 
presence of seemingly unsubstantiated assertions.11 
 
Studies of specific Kasaian ethnicities are equally sparse,12 even more so those that seek to 
illustrate the transition of societies into the colonial era, though their achievements have 
been altogether more noteworthy than regionally-focused studies. Vansina’s lifelong work 
on the Kuba has recently culminated in the publication of Being Colonized, an important 
                                                             
9 A. Van Zandijcke, Pages d’Histoire du Kasayi (Grand Lakes: Namur, 1953).  
10 Daisy S. Martens, ‘A History of European Penetration and African Reaction in the Kasai Region of 
Zaire, 1880-1908’ (PhD, Simon Fraser University, 1980). Insofar as the pre-colonial period is 
concerned, similar remarks apply to the relevant sections of A. von Oppen, Terms of Trade and Trust: 
the History and Contexts of Pre-Colonial Market Production around the Upper Zambezi and Kasai (Lit: 
Hamburg, 1993). 
11 Baudouin Mwamba Mputu, Baudouin, Le Congo-Kasaï (1865-1950): De l'exploration allemande à 
la consécration de Luluabourg (L'Harmattan: Paris, 2011). 
12 Although Fairley’s PhD work on the Ben’eki is a notable exception. See Nancy Jane Fairley, 'Mianda 




study of the Kuba’s adaptation to the onset of European colonialism.13 While Being 
Colonized is impressive in its job of charting the modern history of the Kuba of northern 
Kasai, the book does not attempt a systematic comparison between the experiences of the 
Kuba and those of their neighbours. Neither does the book fully sketch the broader 
regional context into which the Kuba trajectory must be placed. Vansina, for instance, 
devotes a mere two pages to the history the Zappo-Zap. Some work has also been carried 
out on the Bena Lulua, most notably by Congolese scholar Luadia-Luadia and, with specific 
reference to the hemp-based Lubuku cult, by Fabian.14 While covering the relationships 
between the Lulua leader Kalamba and German officer Hermann von Wissmann and his 
colleagues, neither work present a sufficiently detailed picture of the evolution of Euro-
African relations following the takeover of the post of Luluabourg by Belgian officers of the 
Congo Free State in 1886. .  
 
Furthermore, whilst the history of the fierce-some warlord Ngongo Luteta has long allured 
scholars,15 the broader social consequences of the politics of violence and predation that 
he and other Arab-ised African warlords embodied have not been fully teased out. 
Although some works touch upon the mass flights prompted by the extensive slaving 
operations of the warlords,16 the subsequent fate of these refugees – including such 
Songye groups as the Zappo-Zap – has not been systematically explored. Thus, little is 
                                                             
13 Vansina, Being Colonised. See also Jan Vansina, Children of Woot : a History of the Kuba Peoples 
(Wisconsin University Press: Madison, 1978). 
14 Ntambwe Luadia-Luadia, ‘Les Luluwa et le commerce Luso-Africain (1870-1895)’, Etudes d'Histoire 
africaine, Volume 7, (1974), p. 55-104; Johannes Fabian, Out of Our Minds: Reason and Madness in 
the Exploration of Central Africa (University of California Press: Berkeley, 2000). 
15 A recent example is David M. Gordon, 'Interpreting Documentary Sources on the Early History of 
the CFS: The Case of Ngongo Luteta's Rise and Fall', History in Africa, Vol. 41, (June 2014), p. 5-33.  
16 See, for instance, Alan P. Merriam, Culture History of the Basongye (African Studies Program: 
Indiana University; Bloomington, 1975); Jean-Luc Vellut, 'Émeri Cambier (1865-1943), fondateur da 
la mission du Kasaï. La production d'un missionnaire de légende', in Pierre Halen and János Riesz 
(eds.), Images de L'Afrique et du Congo/Zaïre dans les lettres belges de langue française et alentour 




known of their resettlement in western Kasai in collaboration with CFS representatives and 
of their relations with neighbouring ethnicities.17  
 
Outline 
This dissertation advances a new understanding of the patterns of violence that 
characterized the CFS by exploring the under-studied history of the Zappo-Zap and their 
role in Kasaian politics. The Zappo-Zap were a social group that emerged out of the Songye 
peoples, situated between the Sankuru and Lomami rivers. The Zappo-Zap established a 
form of ‘colonial’ dominance over neighbouring ethnic groups prior to the European 
penetration of the region; and their collaborative relationship with the CFS from the late 
1880s aptly typifies the power balance between African and European agents throughout 
the existence of the CFS.  
 
The first chapter seeks to elucidate the political structures present in the Congo before the 
establishment of the CFS. It begins with a discussion of a ‘traditional’ savanna polity, the so-
called Luba Empire, which used spiritual institutions and comparatively benign socio-
economic conventions to bind together rulers and ruled. The chapter then moves on to 
charting the violent fragmentation of this type of African polities as a result of the savanna 
integration into global ivory and slave trading systems. Both Ovimbundu/Luso-African and 
Arab-Swahili trading networks are discussed . An examination of the modus operandi of the 
commercial empire of Tippu-Tip and his warlord allies is then presented with a view to 
making the argument that the CFS grafted itself onto pre-existing structures of exploitation. 
 
                                                             
17 Minor exceptions to the rule are Paul Timmermans, 'Les Sapo Sapo prés de Luluabourg', Africa-
Tervuren, Volume 8, Issue 1/2, (1962), p. 29-53, and Musuy-Bakul Libata, ‘Regroupement des 
balubas et ses conséquences géo-politiques dans la périphérie de Luluabourg (1891-1960)’, Annals 




Chapter two looks more specifically at the Zappo-Zap and the history of their migration to 
eastern Kasai. The Zappo-Zap originally belonged to a sub-section of the Ben’eki,  a sub-
group of the Songye people of western Kasai. Prior to their exposure to the Europeans, the 
Zappo-Zap had been successful agents of the slave trade, cultivating contacts with both the 
western Luso-African and the eastern Arab-Swahili trading networks. In the increasingly 
fragmented and volatile landscape of western Kasai, however, the followers of Nsapu-
Nsapu found themselves on the receiving end  of persecution at the hands of Arab-ised 
warlords who shared their own openness to foreign trade and violent forms of political 
action. The Zappo-Zap flight to the CFS post on Luluabourg in 1887 was the end-result of 
this state of affairs.   
 
It was at Luluabourg that the Zappo-Zap were fully co-opted into the fabric of the emerging 
colonial State, taking on the roles of ‘capitas’ to oversee the extraction of taxes and, most 
importantly, fighting as an auxiliary force on behalf of the State. This process of adaptation 
led to the Zappo-Zap supplanting the Bena Lulua leader Kalamba – the subject of chapter 
three – as the key African collaborator of the CFS in eastern Kasai.  Whilst Kalamba rejected 
CFS governance in 1890, the Zappo-Zap remained fiercely loyal to the State. Chapter four 
examines how this loyalty expressed itself at several critical junctures – from the 
Luluabourg revolt of 1895 to the Kuba rebellion of 1904, passing through the famous 
Pyaang Massacre of 1899 – and the benefits that it brought to the Zappo-Zap. 
 
The Zappo-Zap, in sum, serve as a prime example of African agency and highlight the 
impact of pre-existing politico-economic dynamics on the CFS. The agents of the global 
slave and ivory trade, they were also the victims of this very same trade, having been 
driven from their homeland by stronger regional warlords. Moreover, the Zappo-Zap were 




history, then, epitomizes the complexity and diversity of the African experience both during 
and after the CFS. If nothing else, they bear out the validity of Vansina’s musing 
that throughout the colonial period none of the colonized subjects have ever 
shared the same fate in equal measure […] Moreover, once one starts to label 
who was what, one soon finds out that the identification of ‘winners’ and ‘losers’ 
can shift.18 
 
Sources and Methodology 
Thanks to the pioneering works of Jan Vansina and his students, the history of the peoples 
of the Congo basin prior to the arrival of the Europeans is now recognised within the 
scholarly community. This is not to say that this relatively new field of study is not fraught 
with problems: the lack of substantial written records prior to the mid-nineteenth-century 
has led to methodological approaches that can be viewed as controversial, such as 
historical linguistics,19 and the reliance on oral sources and oral traditions.20 Having been 
personally unable to carry out field research in the Congo, this thesis draws upon oral 
traditions as recorded by other historians, predominantly those of the Ben’eki as collected 
by Fairley.21 As a large body of literature has established, oral traditions can be problematic 
sources.22 However, in the 1970s, the time of Fairley’s research, at least some of the 
                                                             
18 Vansina, Being Colonized, p. 327. 
19 On which, see, for instance, Derek Nurse, 'The Contribution of Linguistics to the Study of History in 
Africa', Journal of African History, Volume 38, No. 3, (1997), p. 359-391, and Jan Vansina, How 
Societies are Born: Governance in West Central Africa before 1600 (University of Virginia Press: 
Virginia, 2004), particularly the Introduction and Chapter One. 
20 See Jan Vansina, Oral Tradition: A Study in Historical Methodology, (Aldine Pub. Co: Chicago, 
1965). 
21 Nancy Jane Fairley, 'Mianda Ya Ben'Ekie’.  
22 See, for example, G. Clarence-Smith, 'For Braudel: A Note on the École des Annales' and the 




testimonies she collected were still comparatively close to the events that they described. 
This clearly enhances their reliability.23  
 
There is also the fortune of being able to draw upon a sufficient body of written records 
pertaining to Kasaian history in the nineteenth-century. The main body of written 
documents employed in this dissertation consists of the records of European travellers,  
missionaries, and officers of the Force Publique (FP). Informed by obvious racial biases, 
most of these documents tend to oscillate between romantic notions of the ‘noble savage’ 
and damning, sweeping statements of endemic ‘savagery’. Needless to say, these 
ideological nuances led their European authors to resort to either self-censorship and/or 
exaggeration in their portrayal of Africans for the benefit of their readers: reports of 
cannibalistic practices are a prime example of this. Further complications arise when the 
state of mind of many of the Europeans in the African interior is borne in mind: many were 
suffering from illness and disease, intoxication and fatigue, which were liable to distort 
their perception of reality.24 There is little that historians can do about these problems, 
aside from practicing critical awareness. The difficulties that arise from the commercial 
nature of travel writings, 25 however, can be curbed by drawing upon unpublished archival 
sources, if and where possible. With this aim in mind, this dissertation makes full use of the 
                                                             
23 David Henige identifies two such practices within oral traditions which can challenge chronological 
integrity: "telescoping" and "artificial lengthening". Telescoping is the process of omitting the reign 
of kings from the political narrative of societies: usually those which occur in the middle, and thus do 
not impact the genesis story or the existing dynasty. Artificial lengthening is the incorporation of 
additional figures into the historical narrative, such as including gods as human rulers. See David 
Henige, The Chronology of Oral Tradition: Quest for Chimera (Clarendon Press: Oxford, 1974), p3-9. 
The possibility of these distortions are lessened, however, the closer the events recalled in the 
tradiitons are to living memory. 
24Fabian, Out of Our Minds; R. C. Bridges, 'Nineteenth-Century East African Travel Records', in B. 
Heintze and A. Jones (eds.), European Sources for Sub-Saharan Africa before 1900, Special Issue of 
Paideuma, Volume 33, (Kohlhammer: Stuttgart, 1987); Beatrix Heintze, ‘Ethnographic 
Appropriations : German Exploration and Fieldwork in West-Central Africa’, History in Africa, Volume 
26, (1999), p69-128. 
25
 See Fabian Out of Our Minds, p. 252-4. For a clear example of the potentially distorting impact of 
the editorial process, see Dorothy O. Helly, Livingstone’s Legacy: Horace Waller and Victorian Myth-




rich personal collections of two Congo Free State officers: Captain de Macar and 
Commissaire Gillain, who served in Luluabourg from 1886.   
 
The problems posed by published sources emerge particularly starkly in relation to some of 
the documents used in chapter four: the writings of Morel’s Congo Reform Association that 
incorporate the testimonies of such missionaries as William Sheppard and William 
Morrison, of the American Presbyterian Congo Mission (APCM).26 The well-known history 
of the movement and its campaign against the CFS and the Compagnie du Kasaï (CK) need 
not retain our attention here.27  A brief mention of the bias behind the written sources 
documenting the Pyaang Massacre is necessary, however. The shocking brutality of the 
incident, witnessed in part by Sheppard, triggered an international humanitarian campaign 
to end the violent exploitation of the Congo. However, early human rights activists (not 
unlike their contemporary counterparts) drew on missionary and other Congolese 
testimonies for primarily polemical purposes and with little regards for historical detail. 
Thus, for example, ‘The Deeds’, a section of Morel's Red Rubber, consists of extracts of 
letters from Europeans (predominantly missionaries) based in the CFS. Yet, extracts from 
varying regions are juxtaposed next to each other and taken out of their local socio-political 
context. In some cases, their place of origin is no more precisely indicated than ‘river banks, 
central region, Domain Privée.’28 Morel’s account of the Zappo-Zaps’ killings at Pyaang is a 
case in point: the atrocities are presented as a stand-alone event and the accompanying 
attacks on the Kuba royal capital which make the atrocities partially intelligible do not even 
rate a mention. Whatever the political undertones of missionary reports or the human 
rights’ campaign that they inspired, these sources remain nonetheless useful historians. If 
                                                             
26 See for example E.D. Morel, King Leopold’s Rule in Africa (Heinemann: London, 1904); E.D. Morel, 
Red Rubber: The Story of the Rubber Slave Trade Flourishing on the Congo in the Year of grace 1907 
(T. Fisher Unwin: London, 1907). 
27
 See, in particular, William Roger Louis and Jean Stengers, E.D. Morel’s History of the Congo Reform 
Movement (Clarendon Press: Oxford, 1968).  




examined with a critical eye, they still provide much valuable insights into the history of the 






OLD POLITICS AND NEW MEN 
 
Contrary to what many nineteenth-century European observers assumed - the 
philosopher Hegel, for one, asserted that Africa was ‘no historical part of the World; 
it has no movement or development to exhibit’1 - the interior of the African 
continent had witnessed the development of social and state structures for centuries 
before the time of European contact. While some societies, not least the Songye of 
eastern Kasai, had devised a system of rotating chieftainship which allowed equal 
access to power for different kin groups, based on the decisions of a council of 
elders,2 centralised empires were not unknown in the southern savanna of Central 
Africa before the nineteenth century. These polities were founded upon conquest 
and assimilation – not dissimilar, in this respect, to the European imperial structures 
that emerged in the late nineteenth century.  
 
However, these autochthonous states were challenged in dramatic fashion by the 
intrusion of international trade. Whilst regional indigenous trading networks 
flourished up until the 1870s, on the west coast of Central Africa, in present-day 
Angola, Portuguese and Luso-Africans merchants conveyed the international demand 
                                                             
1 Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, The Philosophy of History (Dover Publications: New York, 
1956), p. 99.Hugh Trevor Roper famously echoed these sentiments, proclaiming African 
history to be ‘the unedifying gyrations of barbarous tribes in picturesque but irrelevant 
corners of the globe.’ For the full article, see ‘The Past and Present: History and Sociology’, 
Past and Present, Volume 42, (1969), p. 3-17. 
2 Tippu Tip (ed. and tr. W.H. Whitely), Maisha ya Hamed bin Muhammed el Murjebi, yaani 
Tippu Tip (East African Literature Bureau: Nairobi, 1974; 1st ed., 1958-9), p. 67.  
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for ivory, palm oil, beeswax, gum, coffee, cotton and, later, rubber.1 Slaves, too, were 
in demand, although the shrinking of the Atlantic slave market meant that more and 
more of them were deployed internally within the continent. These goods were 
traded for cloth, alcohol and firearms, among other things. Similarly, on the opposite 
side of the continent, the east coast saw the rise of Arab-dominated trading 
networks.  As international demand rose and market competition stepped up, 
coastal traders began to penetrate the interior as a means of accessing greater and 
cheaper volumes of slaves and ivory. Whilst ivory was initially obtained through 
peaceful means, the acquisition of slaves was often a violent business, involving 
warfare and raids, which were either undertaken directly by the traders themselves 
or by those supplying the slaves. Thus, the penetration of eastern and western 
traders deeper into the continent brought a trail of blood and the breakdown of 
social cohesion in its wake. These developments, of course, were exacerbated by the 
firearms which the traders carried and made available to inland communities. It was 
in the region situated between the Kasai and Sankuru rivers that eastern and 
western trading webs intersected.  
 
The influx of foreign imports brought instability to traditional African polities as 
subjects on the periphery of kingdoms established relationships with the traders. The 
ready accessibility of firearms and luxury European items meant that those in contact 
with traders had the opportunity to lure dependents away from the centralised 
power bases of the kingdom, and to gain the military resources with which directly to 
challenge the socio-political status quo. These dynamics led to the disintegration of 
some of the main political formations of the southern savanna, beginning with the 
                                                             
1
 A. E. Atmore, 'Africa on the eve of partition', 1908’, in Roland Oliver and G.N. Sanderson 
(eds), The Cambridge History of Africa Volume 6: From 1870 to 1905 (Cambridge University 
Press: Cambridge, 1985), pp, 68-9. 
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Luba and Lunda kingdoms, which had had little previous exposure to firearms.2 The 
power vacuums thrown open by the demise of the old states were filled by the rise 
of ‘new men’, political entrepreneurs who sought to harness international trading 
networks to their own advantage. These ‘new men’ used trade to acquire the supply 
of firearms which gave them the upper-hand over neighbouring communities and, 
therefore, the opportunity to accumulate slaves and plunder. The Chokwe and 
Ovimbundu of present-day Angola exemplify such processes of adaptation in the 
face of politico-economic change; as do the warlords to the east of the Kasai who 
sought out the patronage of the Arab merchant-warriors installed around Lake 
Tanganyika. It is the latter – Ngongo Luteta, Lumpungu, Mpania Mutombo and 
others - who are most relevant to the history of the Zappo-Zap.  
 
This chapter examines these developments in detail, with a view to contextualizing 
the manner of the Congo Free State. It has been divided into five sections. The first 
section looks at the  workings of the Luba Empire, a prime example of traditional 
African political formation. The next examines the Luso-African trading activities 
originating from the west coast, and how these led to the disintegration of the old 
political order. The third section explores the framework of the ‘Arab’ commercial 
‘empire’ centred on the famous Zanzibari merchant-warrior, Tippu-Tip. The 
penultimate section focuses on a prominent vassal of Tippu-Tip, Ngongo Luteta, 
whose life and career aptly illustrates the continuity between the CFS and previous 
political frameworks. Whilst Ngongo rose to power through the patronage of Tippu-
Tip, he later served the CFS in its campaigns against the Arabs; his followers were 
incorporated into the ranks of the Force Publique, the standing army of the State. 
                                                             
2
 This is not a hard and fast rule, however. The Luyana kingdom in Barotseland, for example, 
survived into the era of European colonialism in spite of a brief period under the rule of the 
armed Makololo peoples.  
OLD POLITICS AND NEW MEN 
15 
 
The last section deals with the initial establishment and policies of CFS as a whole, as 
a general backdrop to Kasai-specific developments. 
 
The Luba Empire 
At its height in 1860s, the Luba Empire spanned the Luembe River to the west and 
skirted Lake Tanganyika and Lake Mweru to the east. It was during what Reefe 
termed the dynastic ‘Age of Kings’, roughly dating from 1700 to the 1860s, that the 
Luba Empire enlarged its peripheral territories and consolidated its regional 
supremacy, the greater part of its expansion dating to the eighteenth-century.3 
While Reefe's study reveals that the Luba tended to follow ‘the path of least political 
and military resistance’,4 the expansion of the Luba polity from its heartland near the 
Upemba depression into what is now Katanga was undeniably brutal, despite the 
temptation to compare it favourably with ‘industrial’ contemporary European 
warfare.5 Valour in battle was celebrated and provided a means for social mobility, 
alongside the material rewards and spoils from local wars and raids, denoting that 
warfare was part and parcel of Luba culture and politics. Furthermore, as the 
territory under the authority of the Luba King – the Mulopwe – increased, so did the 
necessity to rely on force and terror to ensure that tribute was collected from the 
areas on the peripheries of the state. Mutilations were common during military 
operations: it was accepted that a warrior may have a foot severed, should he try 
and flee from battle; amputations and mutilations were also inflicted as a 
punishment for subdued villages.6 The Zanzibari trader Tippu-Tip provides an eye-
                                                             
3 Thomas Q. Reefe, The Rainbow and the Kings: A History of the Luba Empire to 1891 
(University of California Press: Berkeley, 1981), p. 107. 
4
 Ibid., p. 108. 
5 Ibid., p. 109-110. 
6 Ibid., p. 110. 
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witness account of the use of these terror tactics during the reign of King Ilunga 
Kabale (roughly dating 1840-1870): 
Each time he went into combat, he placed in front of him all those whose 
arms, noses and ears had been cut off and thus he terrorized his 
adversaries [...]. In all their villages one sees three or four hundred men 
with either their noses, ears or arms cut off.7 
Violence was thus a tool of power and authority, and it was certainly not the 
exclusive preserve of later European empires.  
                                                             
7 Tippu-Tipp in ibid. 
Map 2. 'Luba Empire: late eighteenth century to the 1860s', in Thomas Q. Reefe, The Rainbow and the 
Kings: A History of the Luba Empire to 1891 (University of California Press: Berkeley, 1981), p. 116. 
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While it is thus important not to indulge in romantic fantasies idealising ‘noble 
savages’, the distinguishing feature of power in these ancient central African states 
was the use of religious institutions and the divine nature of kingship. The political 
organisation of the Luba Empire is best understood by imagining a ‘pyramid of 
pyramids.’8  The top pyramid of power represents the Luba king and his court, at the 
political and mystical centre of the Empire. This centre was considered sacred 
because of the residence of the Mulopwe. The Luba genesis myth, the oral epic of 
the Luba Empire, enshrines the concept of the divinity of the Mulopwe: the warrior 
Kalala Ilungu is said to have become king after defeating the cruel autochthonous 
king, Nkongolo. Then, Kalala introduced and personified the institution of divine 
kingship, with the aid of his father, the wandering hunter Mbidi Kiluwe.9 Regardless 
of whether this story can be taken to reflect distant historical events, or whether it 
provides any chronological insights into the foundation of the Luba Empire, the king’s 
divine right to rule, as passed through the male bloodline and originating with Kalala, 
was a central aspect of Luba power and authority. The rituals surrounding the 
investiture of a new king reinforced the monarchy’s spiritual aspects; the king was 
perceived as a vidye, a nature spirit, which was exemplified through insignias and 
taboos of kingship.10  
 
                                                             
8 Ndaywel e Nziem, 'The political system of the Luba and Lunda: its emergence and 
expansion', in B.A. Ogot (ed.), UNESCO General History of Africa, Volume 5: Africa from the 
Sixteenth to the Eighteenth Century (UNESCO and Heinemann: Paris, 1992) p. 595; Reefe, 
Rainbow and the Kings, p. 79. 
9 Mary Nooter Roberts and Allen F. Roberts, 'Audacities of Memory', in Mary Nooter Roberts 
and Allen F. Roberts (eds.), Memory: Luba Art and the Making of History (The Museum for 
African Art: New York, 1996), p. 20. 
10 Jan Vansina, Kingdoms of the Savanna (University of Wisconsin Press: Madison, 1966), p. 
74. 
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The Mulopwe and his court were paramount over a hierarchy of smaller pyramids. 
The village groupings closest to the heartland of the Empire were higher up the 
political hierarchy, although, out of these, royal sacred villages, having some link with 
sacred ancestors or spirits from the characters in the Genesis Myth, were favoured 
over villages not linked to the royal lineage.11 It was this spiritual connection that 
preserved the legitimacy of the Luba kings: ‘The relationship between the Luba royal 
dynasty and the royal sacred-village groupings of the heartland, where ancestral 
spirits were venerated, became so formalized through myth, oral traditions, and 
rituals that the living king came to be seen as an equal to these royal spirits.’12  
 
However, it was not only the king that symbolised ancestral spiritual power. The 
bambudye was an elite Luba secret society, of which membership was mandatory for 
those holding high official positions in the Empire.13 The bambudye was a means to 
                                                             
11
 Reefe, Rainbow and the Kings, p. 79-80. 
12 Ibid., p. 83. 
13 Ibid., p. 46. 
Figure 1. ‘Pyramids Upon Pyramids’ in Thomas Q. Reefe, The Rainbow and the Kings: A History of 
the Luba Empire to 1891 (University of California Press: Berkeley, 1981), p79. 
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hold political leaders to account, as all members formed a bond that was distinct 
from their kinship ties and secular life: bambudye members, when dressed in 
ceremonious garb, were anonymous and were considered spiritual entities who 
could preside over Luba villages.14 Because of its inclusive nature, the bambudye was 
an effective instrument of political integration: members from different regions 
shared a set of values, having been through the same initiation rituals and being 
subject to the same charter.  
 
Reefe, furthermore, suggests that the bambudye of the Luba Empire was modelled 
on the bakasandji secret society of the Songye peoples: King Ilungu Sungu (who 
reigned between ca 1780 and 1810) is remembered to have grown up in the Songye 
region before he was old enough to inherit the Luba throne and introduce the 
practice.15 There seems to be a long history of inter-cultural borrowing between the 
Luba and Songye peoples, although the bakasandji seems to be the only Songye 
institution to have been fully incorporated into Luba culture. This is evidence of the 
‘soft power’ of Luba rulers,16 who sometimes expanded their influence and territory 
through cultural and spiritual means, as opposed to purely violent and military ones. 
Local Songye ancestral spirits, for example, were drafted into the Luba king-list as the 
Luba heartland relocated closer to the Songye border.17 
 
                                                             
14 Ibid., p. 47-48. The bambudye, however, could also be used by the Mulopwe as a tool of 
power: the bambudye were charged with transmitting the Luba Genesis Story through 
generations, which served to validate and consolidate the historical power and precedence of 
the ruling Mulopwe. 
15Ibid., p. 117. 
16 A term first coined by Joseph Nye in Bound to Lead: The changing nature of American 
power, (Basic Books: New York, 1990). He later clarified the meaning of ‘soft power’ as ‘the 
ability to get what you want through attraction rather than coercion or payments.’ See Soft 
Power: The Means to Success in World Politics (Public Affairs: New York, 2004), p. x. 
17 Reefe, Rainbow and the Kings, p. 97. 
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The collection of tribute also worked as a traditional tool of power, advantageous to 
both the king and his people. While tribute may be understood as an exploitative 
system of taxation, it is likely that Luba tributary obligations brought into being a 
web of exchanges that were mutually beneficial to all participants. Subjects in all of 
the regions of the empire, especially, of course, those closer to the Luba heartland, 
were expected to pay tribute to the Mulopwe as a symbol of political loyalty. While 
the royal court did indeed keep a proportion of the incoming wealth, the court was 
actually more important as a nucleus of redistribution. It was through this system 
that subjects acknowledged the supremacy of the king, allowing him a legitimate 
political mandate, whilst gaining access to resources from other parts of the polity 
that may not have been attained outside of the imperial framework. 
 
The purpose of the above discussion was to argue that there was a cohesive and 
inclusive aspect to the Luba Empire and other contemporary central Africa states – 
one that, as will be argued below, would not be replicated in later warlord political 
formations.  
 
The Angolan Long-distance Trade 
The central African empires and societies that existed prior to significant foreign 
penetration were linked through the operations of regional and local trading 
networks. Indeed, Vansina emphasises that ‘all the regional trade networks of the 
whole Kwango and the Kasai as far east as the Songye were linked to each other.’18 
However, over the course of the nineteenth-century, commercial agents originating 
from both the Portuguese-dominated western coast and the Arab-Swahili-dominated 
eastern coast encroached upon the central African interior. These merchants and 
                                                             
18 Jan Vansina, 'Long-Distance Trade-Routes in Central Africa', Journal of African History, 
Volume 3, No. 3, (1962), p. 381. 
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caravaneers traded in ivory and slaves: both resources were plentiful in the 
comparatively densely populated region corresponding to present-day Kasai. It was 
thus only a matter of time before the territory was directly incorporated into long-
distance trading networks orchestrated by coastal agents. The Kasai region, as 
previously alluded to, is especially significant when discussing the integration of the 
Congo basin into global commercial networks, as it was the area which witnessed the 
convergence of western and eastern trading frontiers. 
 
Although this dissertation is especially concerned with the relationships between 
Kasaian societies and their aggressive neighbours to the east – the Arab-Swahili 
merchant-warriors and their warlord acolytes – the trade between the Kasai and the 
territory corresponding to present-day Angola must also be considered. The Kasai 
area, being easily accessible from the west because of the waterway systems, was 
not left untouched by Afro-Portuguese trading influences. Indeed, diplomatic 
negotiations between Portugal and King Leopold over their respective spheres of 
influences would prove tense because of the clear historical significance of these 
western coastal influences themselves. It was not until 1891 that an official border 
agreement was reached between Portugal and the CFS: Portugal gained the 
territories to the west of the Kasai, and the CFS retained the lands to the east. There 
had been a Portuguese commercial presence on the western coast from 1493; yet it 
was from 1769, when the formal ban on trading in the interior of Angola was lifted, 
that numerous Angolan peoples were drawn into the orbit of the long-distance 
trade.19 When describing the networks revolving around Angola, the emphasis 
should be placed on African agency and adaptation; even up until the year 1900,  
                                                             
19 Ibid., p. 383. 




Map 3. 'Maximum Chokwe Expansion: Peoples, Place and Trade-Routes, c.1890', in J.C. Miller, 'Cokwe Trade and 
Conquest in the Nineteenth Century', in Richard Gray and David Birmingham (eds.), Pre-Colonial African Trade: Essays 
on Trade in Central and Eastern Africa before 1900 (Oxford University Press: London, 1970), p199. 
OLD POLITICS AND NEW MEN 
23 
 
Africans formed the bulk of traders and caravaneers.20 
 
The Ovimbundu of the central Angolan highlands proved especially apt at 
acclimatising to the changes ushered in by the acceleration of international 
commerce. The Ovimbundu consisted of several kingdoms, most likely migrants from 
the Lunda and Luba empires, who had settled on the Angolan plateau over 400 years 
ago.21 The largest kingdom was Bihé. Since the 1650s there had been a Luso-African 
commercial hub at the capital of the Imbangala kingdom, Kassange,22 which served 
as a centre for the exchange of European items and African products such as ivory 
and slaves. Yet, as alluded to, the Portuguese prohibition on trading in the interior 
was lifted in 1769:  competition from rising African entrepreneurs, such as the 
Ovimbundu, led the Imbangala to lose their exclusive trading monopoly by the early 
1800s.23 The increasing presence of long-distance traders in the interior led 
opportunistic kings to form temporary alliances in an attempt to monopolise trade 
and hence maximise their potential profits. The Ovimbundu alliance with the Luba 
Mulopwe, Kasongo Kalombo, in the 1860s is a case in point. Kasongo allowed 
Ovimbundu traders to raid peripheral Luba subjects to supply the slave markets.24 By 
the 1870s, Ovimbundu men, women and children widely joined caravans to the 
interior in order to act as middlemen between the African polities, such as the Lunda 
                                                             
20 Jean-Luc Vellut, 'Garenganze/Katanga- Bié - Benguela and Beyond: The Cycle of Rubber and 
Slaves at the Turn of the 20th Century', Portuguese Studies Review, Volume 19, Issue 1-2, 
(2011), p. 145. 
21 Gladwyn Murray Childs, ‘The Chronology of the Ovimbundu Kingdoms’, Journal of African 
History, Volume 11, Issue 2, (1970), p. 248. 
22
 Also spelt ‘Kasanje’ in some texts. 
23 Vansina, 'Long-Distance Trade-Routes', p. 382-3. 
24 Martens, 'History of European Penetration', p. 41. 
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Empire, within the interior and the Portuguese traders and Luso-Africans settled on 
the western coast.25   
 
The Chokwe were another ethnic group who managed to adapt to the rise in 
competitive trading on the western coast, and would eventually rise to great 
prominence in the Kasai region. Indeed, the Hungarian anthropologist Emil Torday, 
conducting fieldwork in the late 1900s, remarked that ‘they are a great people, and 
have altered the map of Central Africa as effectually as Napoleon altered that of 
Europe, and possess the finest fighting qualities.’26 The Chokwe people originally 
resided near the sources of the Kasai and Kwango rivers, living a semi-nomadic 
hunting lifestyle rather than a settled agricultural existence.27  The Chokwe of the 
upper Kasai had seemingly always regarded hunting as a prestigious activity: the 
abolition of the Portuguese monopoly over the exportation of ivory from Angola in 
1836, and the subsequent 300% rise in price, allowed the Chokwe to utilise their 
hunting skills to profit from rising international demand.28 Chokwe competence in 
hunting, however, led to the annihilation of the elephant population in their territory 
by the 1850s.29 This led hunting parties to embark on long expeditions eastwards and 
northwards following the elephant trails. By 1865, Chokwe parties had advanced as 
far as central Kasai, into the territory inhabited by the Bena Lulua, near the 
confluence of the Kasai and Lulua rivers.30 As these hunting parties consisted of 
Chokwe males, there was a strong imperative to acquire foreign women and 
                                                             
25 Linda M. Heywood, Contested Power in Angola: 1840s to the Present (University of 
Rochester Press: Rochester; New York, 2000), p. 15. 
26 Emil Torday, ‘Land and peoples of the Kasai Basin’, The Geographical Journal, Volume 36, 
No. 1 (July 1910), p. 52. 
27 Vansina, Kingdoms, p.216. 
28 Joseph C. Miller, 'Cokwe Trade and Conquest in the Nineteenth Century', in Richard Gray 
and David Birmingham (eds.), Pre-Colonial African Trade: Essays on Trade in Central and 
Eastern Africa before 1900 (Oxford University Press: London, 1970), p. 178-9. 
29Ibid., p. 179. 
30 Vansina, Being Colonized, p. 13. 
OLD POLITICS AND NEW MEN 
25 
 
integrate them into the social structure. Women were either obtained by means of 
raids or bought on the market. The market place of the highly influential Lulua chief, 
Kalamba, in present-day Kananga, was, for example, a major trading spot: by 1880, 
Chokwe males were known to pay up to one large tusk of ivory for a woman they 
desired.31 
 
Alongside the search for ivory, the dramatic increase in the market price of rubber 
further augmented Chokwe inclination for eastward expansion. In 1869, the 'first 
class' quality of the rubber they produced was reported at Benguela, on the western 
coast, and rubber prices soon surpassed those of wax and ivory.32  By 1875 the 
supply of rubber from the vines in the forests of Quiboco, in the Chokwe heartland, 
had been exhausted, compelling the Chokwe to move northwards.33 The process of 
harvesting rubber was open to the participation of women and children; hence, the 
migrations in search of rubber resources allowed whole communities to relocate, as 
an alternative to the male-only ivory hunting bands. However, Chokwe ivory hunters 
and traders continued to operate alongside rubber-gatherers. The opening of slave 
markets in Kalamba's realm and among the Kuba, to the north of the Lulua, 
encouraged Chokwe men to not only purchase women as dependents but also to 
turn to raiding for women themselves. All of these factors perpetuated Chokwe 
expansion and violence.  
 
The military might of these Chokwe raiders had much to do with their considerable 
investment in Portuguese-imported muskets from an early date. The firearms 
                                                             
31 Miller, 'Cokwe Trade', p. 183; see also Chapter Three for more on Kalamba’s trade with the 
Chokwe. 
32
 Ibid., p. 186. 
33 Robert Harms, 'The End of Red Rubber: A Reassessment', Journal of African History, Volume 
16, Issue 1, (1975), p. 75-6. 
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allowed them to encroach upon empires based on 'traditional' modes of rule. The 
central Lunda state, to the south-west of the aforementioned Luba, was an early 
victim of Chokwe assertiveness, who took full advantage of internal dissent within 
the Lunda heartland. Succession to the throne in Luba-Lunda polities often resulted 
in violent disputes, as multiple legitimate heirs battled it out, supported by their 
matrilineal kinsmen. During these violent interregna, the various royal factions 
fought until there was a clear victor or until the alternative heirs had been killed. 
Interregnal battles prevented the Lunda from presenting a united front against 
Chokwe raiders, who frequently resorted to the strategy of supporting one royal 
faction against another. The years between 1883 and 1885 saw the Lunda Empire in 
a near continual state of civil war: four kings (Mwaant Yaav) were murdered and 
succeeded each other in that short space of time.34 The fourth Mwaant Yaav, 
Mudiba, died in October 1885, not at the hands of his Lunda rivals, but in a battle 
against the Chokwe, whose expansion Mudiba had unsuccessfully sought to 
counter.35 The Chokwe overran the Lunda heartland in 1885 and sold much of its 
population into slavery.36 A system of organised exploitation of resources was put in 
place by the Chokwe during their hegemony in Lunda territories, which lasted as late 
as 1898.37  
 
Traders from the west were thus an influential factor in the decline of traditional 
power, just as the establishment of the Arab-Swahili commercial empire in the east 
would erode traditional modes of authority among the Luba and Luba-ised peoples. 
Having examined the chronology and main political consequences of the trade from 
                                                             
34 Edouard Bustin, Lunda under Belgian Rule: The Politics of Ethnicity (Harvard University 
Press: Cambridge, 1975), p. 17. 
35
 Ibid. 
36 Vansina, Kingdoms, p. 224. 
37 Bustin, Lunda under Belgian Rule, p. 18. 
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west, it is now time to turn to the commercial networks that developed in the 
opposite direction. 
 
The ‘Arab’ State in Eastern Congo 
From the middle decades of the nineteenth-century, the long-distance trade routes 
that joined the central African interior and the Indian Ocean were dominated by the 
so-called Arab-Swahili. The term 'Arab-Swahili' is used for convenience, yet the 
identification of who the 'Arab-Swahili' actually were is challenging.38 The term is 
generally used to encompass the culturally heterogeneous, Swahili-speaking peoples 
of the eastern coast of central Africa and Arabs of Omani descent established in 
Zanzibar. Indeed, Norman Robert Bennett is quick to point out that it is largely due to 
the racial prejudices of nineteenth-century European commentators that there 
appears to be a sharp distinction between African (or Afro-Arab) people and 'pure' 
Arabs in written documents.39 He contends that the term ‘Arab-Swahili’ includes ‘all 
Muslim individuals, who thought of themselves as Arabs and who participated in the 
political, economic, and cultural system centring upon Zanzibar.’40 However, others, 
such as Melvin Page, Peter Lary and Marcia Wright, have instead put forward the 
compelling argument that the indigenous followings of coastal merchant-warriors 
such as Tippu-Tip formed their own class, an intermediary between the Arabs and 
Africans, termed waungwana .41 These waungwana  hailed from various groups in 
the interior, but were ‘divorced from their own societies’ due to the  process of 
                                                             
38 See James de Vere Allen, Swahili Origins (James Currey: London,  1993), p. 1-19 
39 Norman R. Bennett, Arab versus European: Diplomacy and War in Nineteenth-Century East 
Central Africa (Africana Publishing Company: New York, 1986), p. 7-11. 
40 Ibid., p. 10. 
41 Page, 'Manyema Hordes' p. 71; Peter Lary and Marcia Wright, ‘Swahili Settlements in 
Northern Zambia and Malawi’, African Historical Studies, Volume 4, No. 3, (1971), p. 547-573; 
Frederick Cooper, 'Islam and Cultural Hegemony: the Ideology of Slaveowners of the East 
African Coast', in Paul E. Lovejoy (ed.), The Ideology of Slavery in Africa (Sage Publications: 
Beverley Hills, 1981), p. 24. 
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Islamisation that involved the adoption of the basic tenets of the Islamic faith, at 
least on the surface, and Arab dress and food.42 The waungwana  participated in 
ivory and slave-raids on communities located outside of Arab patronage networks: so 
long as they respected the Arab monopoly of these products, they were seemingly 
allowed to “steal what they wanted [for] themselves.”43  
 
In the 1870s, while the European presence in central Africa was limited to 
exploratory or minor trading missions, Arab-Swahili merchants – the most prominent 
of whom was the notorious Tippu-Tip – were already consolidating a commercial 
empire to the west of Lake Tanganyika. While the epicentre of the state was in 
Manyema, to the north-east of the Kasai region, the workings of this ‘Arab empire’ 
need to be elucidated for a number of reasons. Firstly, a description of the activities 
of these warrior-merchants goes a long way to redressing the Eurocentric bias that 
characterizes much of the general literature concerning the Congo. It reduces the 
temptation to look upon the founding of the CFS as an unprecedented imposition on 
autochthonous peoples: indeed the very fact that the Arab-Swahili slave traders 
fashioned an empire should dispel the lingering notion that Europeans were the only 
colonialists in the history of Central Africa. Secondly, it would be a fallacy to assume 
that the workings of Tippu-Tip’s commercial empire in the eastern Congo were 
unconnected with developments in adjoining regions, such as the Kasai. The slave-
raiding activities associated with the Arab commercial hubs caused mass migrations 
of refugees westwards due to the socio-political disintegration of their homelands. 
Furthermore, Arab-owned slaves and Arab-ised African warriors originating from 
lands to the east of the Kasai were later incorporated into the CFS  as state agents 
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 Page, 'Manyema Hordes', p. 76-77. 
43 Verney Lovett Cameron, Across Africa (Harper and Brothers Publishers: New York, 1877), p. 
253. 
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and auxiliaries and deployed within the Kasai region itself. This direct correlation 
between Arab-Swahili activities and developments in Kasai under the Europeans will 
be explored in detail in Chapter Four. 
 
Although there were numerous Arab-Swahili traders residing and trading in east-
central Africa since the early part of the nineteenth-century, Tippu-Tip is the best 
documented, owing most likely to his undoubted dominance and success. It was 
Tippu-Tip who inflicted a decisive defeat on Nsama III of the Tabwa in 1867.44 This 
was a watershed moment. Thereafter, African chiefs to the west of Lake Tanganyika 
would rarely be able to defend their monopoly over foreign trade in the region, as 
the Arab-Swahili were now capable of exerting military force to ensure favourable 
trading terms and opportunities. Native resistance to establishing trading relations 
with Tippu-Tip and his followers would from this point onwards be met with warfare. 
The conflict in mid-1872 against the ruler of Kayumba (a Luba client state) after an 
attempt to prevent Tippu-Tip’s caravan from leaving is one such instance.45 From his 
position in Luba territory, Tippu-Tip entered the southern lands of the Songye, 
travelling northwards until he reached the Kusu district of Kasongo Lushie. It was 
here that the foundations of his commercial empire were laid. Claiming royal kinship 
with the chief, Tippu was able to influence politics in the area.46 Indeed, the years 
1873-74 were dedicated to absorbing surrounding peoples into his sphere of 
influence, while the next two years were spent near the already established Arab-
Swahili settlements of Nyangwe and Kasongo.47 Kasongo became the main base for 
                                                             
44 Tippu-Tip, Maisha, p. 19-27; David Livingstone, (ed. Horace Waller), The Last Journals of 
David Livingstone, Volume 1 (John Murray: London, 1874), p. 208-223. 
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 Reefe, Rainbows and the Kings, p. 165. 
46 See the account in Tippu-Tip, Maisha, p. 69. 
47 Reefe, Rainbow and the Kings, p. 167. 
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Tippu-Tip’s excursions in the mid-1870s, until he relocated his headquarters further 




The state that Tippu-Tip gradually brought into being in eastern Congo can be 
conceived of as a series of concentric circles. The central areas, where the bulk of the 
Map 4. ‘Arabs in the Congo’ in Vansina, Jan, Kingdoms of the Savanna (University of Wisconsin Press: 
Madison, 1966), p. 237. 
OLD POLITICS AND NEW MEN 
31 
 
Arab-Swahili and their direct subordinates resided, were havens of comparative 
peace in an otherwise violent environment. Tippu-Tip, according to the testimonies 
of Europeans, took pride in the humane treatment of his slaves, and his efforts in 
undertaking a ‘civilising mission’: such as improving food yields with the introduction 
of new crops, ending fractious African quarrels, opportunities of education.48 Islam 
also provided ideological justification, as Muslim patriarchs could regard themselves 
as having been entrusted with the task of spiritually liberating the African heathens 
and caring for them as members of a global faith community.49 Richard Reid asserts 
that such nineteenth-century commercial centres did indeed provide ‘protection and 
security’, despite also meaning ‘overbearing settlers, social and cultural upheaval, 
and the partial erosion of “sovereignty”’.50 It was even in the interests of local chiefs 
to seek patronage from Tippu-Tip to ensure the maintenance of peace in their areas; 
this policy was actively pursued by chiefs from the Kihandi, Kibongo and Kabanga 
areas in the Manyema region, to the east of the Lualaba River.51  
 
Economically speaking, it made sense to establish a stable and secure centre of 
commercial operations and target the villages and communities in the outer circles 
of the ‘empire’ for slave-raiding and pillaging purposes. Peaceful conditions allowed 
agriculture to flourish in a way that was not possible for those communities subject 
to raids. Kasongo, for instance had been in the throes of a famine prior to Arab-
Swahili occupation. Yet once Kasongo had been brought under the control of Tippu-
Tip and his followers, ‘people from Nyangwe came and bought rice in Kasongo, 
calling the country Bungala because of the quantity of rice [...]. There was peace 
                                                             
48 Page, Melvin E., 'Tippu Tip and the Arab 'Defense' of the East African Slave Trade', Etudes 
d'Histoire Africaine, Volume 6, (1974), p. 113-116; Tippu-Tip, Maisha, p. 110-116. 
49 Cooper, 'Islam and Cultural Hegemony', p. 283-4. 
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 Richard Reid, War in Pre-Colonial Society (The British Institute in Eastern Africa: London, 
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again, and even women travelled; there was no one about who would not either pay 
respect or give them food.’52 Furthermore, attacks on Tippu-Tip’s clients seem to 
have been harshly punished - perhaps in an attempt to discourage fractious 
relationships from developing within the commercial empire. Cameron records one 
such incident, where Tippu's ‘leading men serve out sound and well-deserved 
thrashings to some Wanyamwezi porters from Nyangwe, who had taken advantage 
of the war to commence looting a village’ under the authority of chief ‘Russana’, an 
ally of Tippu-Tip.53 Of course, protection came at a cost: Tippu-Tip imposed a strict 
trading monopoly on ivory and had the power to impress work obligations onto his 
subjects. He himself explained that ‘all authority over them was in our hands, and in 
the matter of ivory they had no right to sell even the smallest tusk, and any work 
that we needed doing, they brought men to do it.’54 
 
There can be no mistaking, however, that Tippu-Tip and his empire brought an 
unprecedented level of violence to the region. Renault emphasises the psychological 
impact of Tippu's raiding activities, alongside the more obvious physical losses: "Son 
acharnement manifestait son intention d’inspirer la terreur aussi bien dans sa 
nouvelle possession que chez les populations limitrophes : c’était la condition 
indispensable au développement du système d’exploitation mis en place.”55 Henry 
Morton Stanley confirms the scale and destructiveness of Tippu-Tip's slaving 
activities on the periphery of his Kasongo base:  
The river border, then, of Manyeuma, from the Luama to Nyangwe, may be 
said to have had a population of 42,000 souls, of which there remain 
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probably only 20,000. The others have been deported, or massacred, or 
have fled to the islands or emigrated down the river.56 
 
Although it was predominantly ivory that Tippu-Tip sought for trading purposes, the 
acquisition of slaves was an important means of providing a domestic and 
agricultural labour force for the permanent trading settlements, as well as for the 
porterage of the ivory gained. Thus, local populations targeted for raids by Tippu-
Tip's followers were not only pillaged or slaughtered for their material goods, but 
were also at risk of being coerced into slavery – be it for domestic purposes or for 
export to the Swahili coast. 
 
While Tippu-Tip was the figurehead and chief benefactor of the Arab-Swahili empire, 
he did not establish a permanent colonial capital from which he could rule. This has 
led some historians to suggest that the Arabs cannot be deemed as state builders in 
the strict sense of the term as economic imperatives shaped their conduct much 
more profoundly than political ones: whilst traditional African leaders ‘had a sense of 
principal, political legitimacy and pride, the traders remained more flexible.’57 
Indeed, akin to Leopold II famously never setting foot in the Congo, Tippu-Tip often 
roamed his empire and the areas outside of his sphere of direct tributary power to 
enhance trading opportunities. He acknowledged his nomadic lifestyle in his 
autobiography, stating that he ‘didn’t settle in one place, but at once was off, not 
staying more than two or three months in any spot.’58 A system of ‘indirect rule’59 
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was thus employed, and a basic state structure cultivated, with Tippu delegating his 
authority to both African collaborators and fellow coastal merchants. These 
delegates, often more brutal and feared than Tippu-Tip himself, were charged with a 
specific region to govern and in which to collect tribute. The armies of the Arab 
merchants were largely made up by slaves: this practice was so commonplace that 
Tippu-Tip mentions his slave militia in his writings by the bye, denoting that there 
was nothing remarkable in this custom.60  
 
Perhaps the most famous of Tippu-Tip’s Congolese lieutenants was Ngongo Luteta, 
who was assigned an area bordering the Lomami river. Tippu-Tip himself comments 
on Ngongo's fierce reputation in his autobiography, asserting that: ‘As for the man I 
left in charge of the Utetera [Batetela], people of those parts feared him more than 
they feared me.’61 
 
Ngongo Luteta 
Ngongo Luteta – or Ngongo Lutete (the spelling varies)62 – was originally a slave, 
although it has been contested as to whether he was of Batetela or Songye origins.63 
Regardless of the uncertainty surrounding his birth, it is clear that Ngongo came 
under the authority of Tippu-Tip, who presumably purchased him while he was still 
young.  Thus, Ngongo was able to rise to the ranks of leader. In his autobiography, 
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Tippu reveals Ngongo's exhibition of valour and loyalty in his service. He rewarded 
him with large number of guns in the early to mid-1880s, delegating him authority 
over the Songye peoples to the west of the Lomami River and providing Ngongo with 
supplies of firearms.64  This superior firepower enabled Ngongo to conduct raids in 
the Songye region in similar fashion to his Arab-Swahili mentors in Manyema.    
 
Indeed, while Ngongo was still loosely tied to Tippu-Tip and acknowledged the 
latter’s superiority, the extent of his power and authority are borne out by the fact 
that the main warlords of the Kasai were Ngongo’s vassals. Both Lumpungu and 
Mpania Mutombo recognised Ngongo's superiority. Ngongo had undeniably strong 
ties with the Arab-Swahili-dominated commercial networks to the east, yet it has 
also been suggested by scholars such as Alan Merriam that he also sought to 
establish links with Angola. Merriam regards Ngongo's visit to Fwamba, an important 
chief of the Bena Lulua, as an attempt to establish an affiliation with Kalamba, the 
‘paramount’ of the Bena Lulua from 1886. It is further suggested that this connection 
with Kalamba was cultivated in order to gain access to the Chokwe, who were at the 
time the key agents in the slave and ivory trade with the Angolan coast.65 However, 
Ngongo was seemingly refused permission to cross Kalamba's territory in order to 
gain direct access to the Chokwe and had to move his temporary slave markets from 
the periphery of Kalamba's kingdom in August 1891, after receiving strong threats 
from the same Lulua leader.66 Although the evidence is patchy, Ngongo's ambition to 
connect the Kasai with both the east and the west coasts does not seem a far-
fetched notion. Thus it becomes clear that the Kasai region was the strategic nexus 
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of trading networks between the Arab-Swahili dominated eastern trading routes and 
the Chokwe-dominated western routes. 
 
The scale of Ngongo's operations in the region was authenticated by contemporary 
eyewitnesses: Michaux refers to Ngongo as ‘le fameux Ngongo Lutete’ when he first 
arrived in Lusambo, the Congo Free State station on the Sankuru, in 1889.67 In August 
1890, Ngongo’s gunmen attacked Lusambo while Le Marinel, the first Commissaire 
de District du Lualaba, was away. While Ngongo was defeated in this instance, his 
power in the region does not seem to have suffered from this setback. Indeed, it was 
at about the same time that he began to extend the range of his raiding activities, 
targeting the Luba-speaking peoples situated between the Lomami and the Sankuru 
rivers. The scale and intensity of Ngongo's raids led to a mass migration of Luba-
speakers from the eastern Kasai region across the Sankuru River. It is important to 
note at this point, that the Luba-speaking peoples that are being referred to here 
should not be confused with the Luba-Katanga or Luba Shankadi (Luba of the 
Heartland), whose empire was briefly considered at the beginning of the chapter. 
Allen F. Roberts asserts that 'Luba' is more than an ethnicity: it is ‘a social identity 
available to a much wider complex of cultures than that of the Heartland.’68 The 
Luba-speakers targeted by Ngongo are commonly referred to as ‘Luba-Kasai’ and are 
indeed geographically distinct from the Luba of the Heartland, or Luba of Katanga.  
 
Although the early history of the Luba-Kasai remains poorly understood, it seems 
that at least some of them were strongly associated with sections of the 
neighbouring Songye population. Thus, the Ben’eki, a Songye sub-group, are 
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reported to have drawn the bulk of their domestic slaves from neighbouring Luba-
speaking peoples.69 It is also apparent that the Luba-Kasai paid tribute to the Ben’eki 
King, Kasongo IV, who is likely to have reigned from c. 1870 to c. 1882.70 However, 
Ngongo's ventures also caused mass devastation to the Songye themselves. The 
violence brought to bear on sections of the Songye was witnessed by Wissmann in 
December 1886. His ‘former friend’ Mona Lumpungu, he reported, ‘had turned to 
the south, where, with the other greatest chief of the Kassonge, Mona Kakesa, he 
had taken refuge in the Baluba country from the murdering and devastating 
expedition of the Arabs.’71 
 
On 13 September 1892, Ngongo was defeated by State forces at the beginning of 
what historians have called the 'Arab Campaign'. This long-drawn campaign was the 
result of the European determination to rid the eastern Congo of the Arab-Swahili 
presence, and lasted until 1894. After being defeated, Ngongo defected to the ranks 
of the CFS, to the detriment of his Arab patrons. He then joined Free State officials in 
their attacks and raids on the Arab-Swahili slavers and traders. David Gordon's recent 
revision of the relationship between Ngongo and the officers of the CFS, however, 
emphasizes "a consistent pattern of political manoeuvrings" on the part of Ngongo, 
who used fears of an imminent Arab threat as leverage to obtain more power and 
resources from the Europeans.72  
 
Michaux's observations on Ngongo's camp in the spring of 1890 demonstrate both 
the size of Ngongo's following and the hybridization of military cultures that 
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characterized it. Ngongo's camp, three days march from Lusambo, displayed both 
African and Arab military elements. There were numerous drums, the noise of which 
was described as an 'infernale cacophonie'; the 983 soldiers stationed at the camp 
carried their guns, 'à la mode arabe, c'est-à-dire la crosse en arrière, l'arme étant 
maintenue dans cette position par la main droite, qui tient le canon à plein main.'73 
The military discipline enforced by Ngongo impressed Michaux, warranting an 
appreciation for the capability of Ngongo’s militias: 
Tout ce monde défilait dans l'ordre le plus parfait, et, en arrivant devant 
nous, se groupait rapidement de façon à former un demi-cercle dont leur 
chef devait occuper le centre. 
C'était la première fois, depuis mon arrivée au Congo, que je voyais un 
pareil développement de force militaire nègre en même temps qu'une 
cérémonie que je qualifierai presque de grandiose et certainement de très 
impressionnante.74 
 
Ngongo's choice of greeting Michaux and other European officers with a handshake 
was also welcomed as a sign of cultural receptiveness.75 It was perhaps these 
favourable impressions that allowed the CFS to later foster a close collaboration with 
Ngongo. Despite this seemingly advantageous alliance, however, Captain Scheerlinck 
controversially ordered Ngongo's execution on 15 September 1893, having accused 
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The Early History of the Congo Free State 
Different from the ancient kingdoms of the savanna, the Congo Free State had more 
in common with the predatory warlord states that had succeeded them in several 
areas in the second half of the nineteenth-century. As we have seen, the Luba 
Empire, a well-known example of the former, largely relied on a system of mutual 
exchanges between the royal courts and the subjects of the Mulopwe. Its institutions 
of rule were predicated on the subjects adopting a 'Luba' identity dependent on the 
appropriation of cultural practices and the perception of kinship. Consequently there 
was a degree of socio-cultural coherence within the Empire, particularly in the 
regions closer to the royal capital at the centre of the state. There are, on the other 
hand, greater parallels between the CFS and the ‘Arab’ State in the Eastern Congo: 
the CFS posts dotted along the frontiers of European penetration are comparable to 
the Arab settlements in Manyema, and both colonial systems had clear economic 
motives. However, the political motivation underlying Arab-Swahili colonisation was 
less sharply defined; what  coastal traders aspired to was essentially a ‘loosely-
defined economic hegemony.’76  Conversely, the CFS, on paper at least, had far-
reaching objectives: King Leopold had secured the Congo basin for himself at the 
1885 Berlin Conference by promoting the notion of a 'civilising mission’ for the 
Congo – one that encompassed spiritual, moral and political aims alongside 
economic ones.77   
 
Furthermore, Leopold acquired the Congo as a private territory in 1885. It was only 
in 1908, when the Belgian government took over its administration, that the vast 
domain became a colony ‘proper’. A major stipulation of the 1885 treaty was that 
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the Congo basin should be open to free trade, and that no preferential treatment 
should be given to any one nationality or organisation, hence the name ‘Free State’. 
There was thus little internal cohesion since the inception of the CFS, making it 'a 
very peculiar kind of organization.'78 Indeed, Leopold allowed for the infiltration of a 
plethora of European and American actors: trading companies and agents, 
missionaries, military men, explorers and anthropologists.  
 
On paper, Leopold's new territory was a vast expanse of land, people and resources 
to be drawn upon not only for his own personal benefit but for that of Belgium as 
well. Nevertheless, in practice, the CFS was plagued by economic instability from its 
infancy. The 1885 free trade provisions meant that the State was not able to levy 
custom duties.79 Such was the initially dire financial situation of the CFS that, by 31 
December 1890, Leopold had pumped the equivalent of 20 million francs from his 
own resources to keep the State afloat.80 The fortunes of the State quickly recovered 
from 1890, thanks to the burgeoning European appetite for wild rubber. Indeed, the 
collection of wild rubber and the violence that it brought in its wake have become 
historically synonymous with the CFS; the rubber is often referred to as 'red rubber', 
allegedly in reference to the blood of the Africans who gathered the said natural. 
Many historians have thus regarded the collection of rubber (and other natural 
resources such as ivory) as the rationale behind the expansion and consolidation of 
the CFS: 
From improvised beginnings, a system developed consisting of rubber 
collecting posts backed up by a highly mobile military and served by a 
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network of armed African auxiliaries (called sentinelles, gardes forestières 
or capitas) stationed in the villages upon which regular rubber quotas were 
imposed.81 
 
Between 1891 and 1892, King Leopold introduced what became known as the 
régime domanial: all of the 'vacant' land within the CFS – that is to say, uninhabited 
or un-worked – was decreed to belong to the State. The products sourced from these 
lands were, as a result, regarded as State property.82 With the régime domanial, the 
State became a massive business enterprise, whose primary function was the 
extraction and trading of the Congo’s two most valuable wild products – ivory and 
rubber – by any means necessary. Yet, though rich in rubber, the Kasai was initially 
kept out of this new dispensation, and was earmarked for the continuation of free 
trade, alongside the lower Congo. This is not to say, however, that the region did not 
suffer abuses akin to the rest of the Congo, as shall be seen. 
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WARLORDS AND WAYFARERS 
 
 
The consolidation of Arab-Swahili power around the northern reaches of Lake 
Tanganyika had, as has been suggested, far-reaching consequences for the interior of 
the continent. The devastation caused by African warlords receiving patronage from 
their coastal masters has been briefly illustrated through the example of Ngongo 
Luteta. Yet Ngongo was but one of the representatives of the new political order. In 
the Songye region of present-day eastern Kasai, between the Lomami and the 
Sankuru rivers, the new patterns of governance that Ngongo embodied were 
replicated by Lumpungu of the Beekalebue, Mpania Mutombo of the Basanga, and 
Nsapu-Nsapu of the Ben’eki. These warlords gained access to firearms from the Arab 
merchants in return for ivory and slaves. This resulted in extensive slave-raiding 
activities within the region in order to sustain the supply of weaponry that was 
central to the power of the new political formations – formations which no longer 
derived their strength from religious institutions, but rather from their openness to 
the market and readiness to resort to extreme forms of violence and coercion. 
 
The competition amongst warlords augmented the level of violence in eastern Kasai 
further as stronger warlords preyed on their weaker peers. The trajectory of the 
Zappo-Zap illustrates the vulnerability of the generation of African leaders-cum-
warlords who equated firearms with power. Even amid their own slaving and




 conquering activities, the Zappo-Zap were targeted and attacked by both Lumpungu 
and Mpania Mutombo. This led to their eventual migration to the newly founded CFS 
post of Luluabourg between 1882/4 and 1887. Nevertheless, narratives such as these 
are more complex than historians sometimes allow for.1 This chapter seeks to 
reconstruct the Zappo-Zaps migration to Luluabourg while taking into account the 
intricacies of the relationships between the various Kasaian warlords, and also those 
between them and the Arab merchant-warriors. It is a fallacy not to take into 
account that even 'strong' Kasai warlords such as Lumpungu (who would later be 
recognised by the Belgians as paramount of all the Songye people)2 were themselves 
exposed to military assaults and the threat of slave raiding. It is important, therefore, 
to understand the events in the Kasai region in this context of widespread turmoil 
and political volatility.  
 
Songye Warlords 
The Songye people, as has been mentioned in Chapter One, are situated between 
the Sankuru and Lomami rivers. Writing in 1975, Alan Merriam noted that ‘almost 
nothing is known of the Basongye before the Arab incursions, which began in the 
1860's; what we know of [them] from that period until 1900 indicates only gross 
fragmentation’.3 Fairley's unpublished study of the Ben’eki in the late 1970s went 
some way to addressing this gap. Yet, as Fairley herself admitted, neither primary 
nor secondary sources have done justice to the Songye. Their complex ‘political 
system [...] apparently confused many explorers, and their reports have successfully 
confused contemporary scholars as well.’4  The Songye oral tradition implies an 
ancient connection with the Luba kingdom, the heartland of which lies to the south 
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of the known nineteenth-century location of most Songye-speakers. The existence of 
secret societies among both the Songye and the Luba attests to this shared spiritual 
heritage; there is also evidence of extensive and ancient trading networks between 
these ethnic groups.5 However, the political framework of Songye society differed 
from the rigid hierarchy found in the Luba kingdom of present-day Katanga.  
 
The Songye ethnonym comprises three main groups: the Beekalebue, Basanga and 
Ben’eki. While Europeans tended to place all Songye-speaking peoples into the same 
‘tribal’ category, these ethnic groups considered themselves as discrete entities.6 
While this thesis is largely centred on the Zappo-Zap, a break-away entity from the 
Ben’eki , the activities of the Beekalebue and Basanga cannot be ignored. 
Movements of communities and refugees in the Lomami valley were extensive from 
the 1870s, partly as a result of the advance of the slave-raiding frontier from the 
East, and also because of links with slave traders from the western coast. This was 
intensified further in the early 1890s by the Arab-European conflict, whose early 
phases at least were played out in Songye territory.7 The extent of the socio-political 
disintegration during this period necessitates the adoption of a comprehensive 
perspective so as to provide a broader and clearer picture of the region; an exclusive 
focus on the experience of the Zappo-Zap would distort and obscure general trends 
and common experiences. It is for this reason that we now turn to a brief discussion 
of the experiences of warlords Lumpungu and Mpania Mutombo. 
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Lumpungu, like Ngongo Luteta, had a direct affiliation with Tippu-Tip. However, 
while Ngongo rose from the position of slave to that of warlord and slave-raider, 
Lumpungu's relationship with the Zanzibari merchant was a consequence of the 
latter’s power-brokering activities. At some point in the 1870s, while travelling 
through the Songye region, Tippu-Tip had played a role in installing Kalamba Kongoi 
(Kaumba ka Ngoyi), Lumpungu’s father, as chief after taking advantage of the 
enfeebled state of the Beekalebue polity due to a local rebellion.8 Once in power, 
access to firearms consolidated Kalamba Kongoi's position. It was in the interest of 
Tippu-Tip to supply the Beekalebue with weapons with which to conduct slave-
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raiding campaigns; a portion of the loot was presented to Tippu as tribute. 
Lumpungu inherited the chieftainship after the death of his father, who, according to 
oral history, died shortly after attaining the title of chief.9 By the early 1880s, 
Lumpungu's strength was such that he could himself act as king-maker among 
neighbouring Songye groups.  
 
The other key warlord in the eastern Kasai region was Mpania Mutombo. Mpania 
had been a vassal of Lumpungu's father. As was the case with Kalamba Kongoi of the 
Beekalebue, Mpania Mutombo became chief of the Basanga through external 
power-brokering. It was Lumpungu himself who worked to install Mpania as chief, 
deposing the legitimate chief Sapo-Mutapu by poisoning him. Both Vansina and 
Timmerman date this episode to 1888; yet this date is undoubtedly mistaken.10 
Indeed, it is certain that, by 1887, Mpania had used his position as leader of the 
Basanga to drive the Zappo-Zap to Luluabourg, as will shortly be elaborated upon. Le 
Marinel, furthermore, noted in passing on 26 March 1887 that ‘Zappo-Mutapo’ was 
dead, placing the death of Sapo-Mutapo in the early months of 1887, at the very 
latest.11 Mpania Mutombo, through his access to firearms and his alliance with 
Lumpungu, was able to maintain his position of authority and subdue rivals to the 
throne, although one of the sons of Sapo-Mutapu never did submit or recognise 
Mpania as chief.12 Indeed, Mpania Mutombo's later collaboration with the CFS 
enabled him to acquire a status that rivalled that of Lumpungu. His alliance was 
rewarded with the recognition of his authority over the Bakua Kalagi, an ethnic group 
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situated in Kaniok territory, in the valley of the Lubilash/Sankuru river.13 At least one 
early CFS official, Cyriaque Gillain, District Commissioner since 1893, thought that 
Mpania’s rise to power represented an 'inadmissible' inversion of the chain of 
command. After all, he wrote,  Mpania, ‘il n'y a pas bien longtemps, était lui-même 
vassal de Lumpungu.’14   
 
Lineage power-brokering, of course, was part of the repertoire of central African 
state-builders long-before the onset of the long-distance trade in ivory and slave. 
Yet, the emergence of new actors on the scene made indigenous political structures 
increasingly vulnerable to exogenous manipulation. Contenders to chiefly positions 
now had external power-brokers to whom they could turn and who had tangible 
material motives to get involved in local disputes. When made available to their local 
allies, the firearms that they controlled helped challenge pre-existing hierarchies and 
legitimate rulers. Once installed, of course, the ‘new men’ had to chart a careful 
course. The origins of both Lumpungu and Mpania Mutombo's power lay beyond 
their own ability and rendered them dependent on the continuing support of those 
directly above them – be they coastal traders or fellow warlords. Indeed, both 
Lumpungu and Mpania Mutombo’s districts lay in the area which Tippu-Tip had 
originally delegated to Ngongo and were theoretically the latter’s subordinates.15 
Thus, following Ngongo’s execution in 1893, Dhanis described Lumpungu as ‘le 
successeur legal de Gongo’.16 Kasaian warlords, in sum, were both powerful and 
vulnerable. Because the states they brought into being – or gained control of –
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depended on uninterrupted access to armaments made available by external 
partners, the fortunes of warlords could change quite suddenly. It is in this whirlwind 
of conflict and turmoil that we must place the emergence of the Zappo-Zap as a 
corporate group, and their migration. 
 
The Origins of the Zappo-Zap: Persecutors and Persecuted 
The Ben’eki, even prior to any foreign political manipulation, experienced a 
succession crisis which laid the foundations for the later separation of chief Nsapu-
Nsapu from the main Ben’eki entity.  Their oral tradition presents Lubamba, an 
alleged relative of the protagonist of the Luba genesis myth, Ilungu Kalala, as the first 
king of the Ben’eki.17 Lubamba's son and heir, Nkole a Lubamba, is widely recognised 
as the first king to actively unite and rule over the Ben’eki.18 From this point 
onwards, the Nkole became the highest political title of the Ben’eki. The exclusive 
preserve of kings, it was heavily associated with the supernatural and ancestral 
forces that were utilised by other polities, such as the Luba Empire, as traditional 
modes of power.19 
 
According to the oral tradition of the Ben’eki, it was perhaps in the early eighteenth-
century that Nkole a Lubamba changed the system of succession by appointing his 
eldest son, Kabangu a Nkole, as successor. This is said to have ushered in a dynastic 
patrilineal succession tradition, whereas before the time of kings, the elders in 
society had enjoyed the right to elect the holders of chiefly positions.20 However, 
Kabangu was ousted by one of his younger brothers, Kiamba kia Nkole, with the 
support of the elders. Kabangu and his followers then moved away from Kiamba's 
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district and established their own political unit, known as Babanga after its first 
leader.21  The Babanga, however, were only one of ten political units within the 
Ben’eki kingdom that developed over time. By the nineteenth-century, the Ben’eki 
polity consisted of three provinces comprising of ten different political units in total; 
each political unit had its own chief, who was superior to the village chiefs at the 
local level.22 The Nkole title, chosen from men from the Babenga political unit, which 
neighboured the Babanga, was recognised as paramount over all of the Ben’eki. 
While close to the heart of Ben’eki power, the Babanga enjoyed a more autonomous 
status than the other political units subservient to the Nkole. The leader of the 
Babanga political unit in the 1880s was a man called Nsapu-Nsapu, who went on to 
challenge the then Nkole and was forced into exile.  
The Babanga were, furthermore, the only unit of the Ben’eki that possessed warrior 
villages aside from the ruling Babenga clan.23 This military development allowed the 
Babanga to dominate some of their Ben’eki’s neighbours, subduing ‘Babindji, Bena 
Lubala, Bakua Mwanza and Bakua Sumpi, all Baluba-Kasai people, to their rule and 
regularly collect[ing] tribute from them.’24 The limits of this sphere of tributary 
influence are supported by Le Marinel. On 23 March 1887, Le Marinel – travelling 
along the Lubefu River – set up camp in Luidi ‘qui appartient à Zappo-Zapp. Plusieurs 
petits chefs nous disent qu’ils sont esclaves de Zappo depuis toujours’.25 A few 
months earlier, Wissmann, too, had reported that the Zappo-Zap dominated the area 
around ‘the place where the Lomami and Sankurru separate...’26 In recording his 
impressions of the Batua – indigenous pygmies of the equatorial forest – he wrote 
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that ‘the Batua were soon going to kill the powerful chief Zappu Zapp, who had made 
himself master throughout this neighbourhood.’27 It seems, then, that although 
contemporary observers also described the Zappo-Zaps as refugees fleeing the 
devastations of Arab raiding to the west of the Lomami river, they were still a 
comparatively strong and military-orientated group in the mid-1880s. 
 
Indeed, the narrative as to how the Zappo-Zap came to settle in Luluabourg (present-
day Kananga, in western Kasai) as associates of the CFS is rather convoluted. Most 
written records oscillate between acknowledging the regional sway of the Zappo-Zap 
and recognizing the extent to which Arab slave raiding in eastern Kasai was 
devastating the regional social landscape. This contradiction is reflected in the 
variety of motives that the same sources attribute to the Zappo-Zap: in some cases, 
they are themselves portrayed as slave raiders; in others, as victims of the trade and 
related violence. The present section endeavours to unravel and reconstruct the 
identity of the Zappo-Zap vis-à-vis other Kasaian factions and in relation to their 
participation in the long distance trade with both the east and the west coasts. 
 
The explorer Herman von Wissmann was probably the first European to gather 
detailed information about the Zappo-Zap, in March 1882.28 He recorded that unlike 
many of their neighbours in Songye country, the people of Nsapu-Nsapu had guns – 
percussion-lock muskets – which they had acquired thanks to their links with the 
Arabs of Manyema.29 Yet Wissmann did not apparently assume that these guns were 
specifically for the purpose of raiding and slave hunting. Four years later, during his 
second journey through the Kasai, Wissmann stated explicitly that ‘the Bassonge 
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chief Zappu Zapp’, who had been forced to flee his original capital and shift his 
headquarters to the right bank of the Sankuru/Lubilash, ‘was not slave-hunting.’30 
 
In fact, the data gathered at the about the same time by Wissmann’s companion, Dr. 
Wolf, cast doubts on the former’s reconstruction. Having encountered Nsapu-Nsapu 
in February 1886 on the Sankuru/Lubilash, Wolf described him as a ‘chasseur 
d’esclaves’ and as ‘le fléau de la région située entre la Lubila(che) et la Lomami. 
Presque tous ses hommes étaient armés de fusils à percussion, qu’il achetait à 
Nyangoue aux Arabes.’31 Nsapu-Nsapu’s, Wolf went on, was ‘le point le plus 
occidental dont le commerce va vers Zanzibar. Plusieurs hommes de Zappou Zappe, y 
compris son fils, parlaient le Souaheli.’32 
 
The fact that the Swahili language had been adopted by many of Nsapu-Nsapu’s 
armed followers suggests a long period of exposure to Arab-Swahili trading. 
According to Wolf, Nsapu-Nsapu caravans were indeed wont to travel to Nyangwe. 33 
Wissmann tells us, furthermore, that the Arab trader Djuma Bin Salim lived amongst 
the Zappo-Zap for nearly a year, prior to their encounter with Wolf, leading to their 
having ‘adopted many customs’ of the Arab's retinue.34 The chief Nsapu-Nsapu, 
alongside his sons, was consequently dressed in Arab fashion, ‘with a cloth round his 
hips, over which he wore a long white shirt; whilst a handkerchief was twisted round 
his head like a turban.’35 Nsapu-Nsapu's followers, however, were dressed in 
traditional Songye attire.36 
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Trade was also established with merchants from the west. The Zappo-Zap appear not 
to have travelled westwards: instead caravans from Bihé, in the highlands of central 
Angola, were despatched to Nsapu-Nsapu’s capital. It is Wissmann himself who, 
whilst staunchly denying Zappo-Zap involvement in the slave trade, unwittingly alerts 
us to the Kasaian activities of Angolan long-distance traders. In October 1886, whilst 
briefly residing in the ‘populous district of Baqua Chameta’, in Kuba territory 
between the Lulua and Sankuru River, he registered the presence of caravan from 
the west coast: 
They carry on the most shameful slave trade imaginable. Black traders from 
Angola or Benguela turn to Bihe carriers or attendants, who, though 
thievish, are comparatively bold and warlike, and who undertake longer 
journeys than any other negroes of the west coast. They go in quest of 
countries where a gun is unknown; they make arrangements with the 
chiefs about supplies of slaves, and they will even join the slave-hunters. 
They then take their prisoners to the Bakuba tribes, where they exchange 
them for ivory...37 
 
His remark that the Bihéans, most likely Ovimbundu, were travelling further than 
other merchants from Angola suggests that these traders had recently begun to 
cross the Sankuru river into Songye territory and the Luba heartland. The fact that 
the Ovimbundu targeted gun-poor peoples and collaborated with local slave-raiders 
indirectly implicates the Zappo-Zap in slaving activities. Indeed, a few months before 
Wissmann’s encounter with the Bihéan caravan in Kuba territory, Dr. Wolf had noted 
that, while the Zappo-Zap had obtained firearms, ‘les autres tribus sont encore 
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armées d’arcs et de fleches.’38 Furthermore, Zappo-Zap involvement in this trade 
triangle is clearly illustrated when in 1886, an estimated eight hundred slaves were 
present at the residence of chief Nsapu-Nsapu, by the Lubilash river, ready to be 
transported to the southern Kuba market of Kabaw by Ovimbundu traders.39 
 
It has been established, therefore, that the Zappo-Zap were able to infiltrate trading 
networks with both the east and west coast of central Africa. These set of 
connections undeniably gave them the technological edge over neighbours who had 
traditionally been subservient to the Babanga political unit, such as the Baluba-Kasai. 
Their dominance is attested by the fact that the Zappo-Zap were able to acquire 
enough slaves to fulfil the demands of two separate slave trading frontiers. On this 
score, it is remarkable that even Ngongo Luteta had not been able to access western 
markets on account of the opposition of Kalamba, situated between the Lulua and 
Sankuru rivers, south of the Kuba Kingdom.40 In sum, Nsapu-Nsapu and his followers, 
while classified as refugees by European commentators, were still a comparatively 
strong and predatory band. This, however, makes the retreat of the Zappo-Zap from 
their homeland at the hands of other Songye chiefs all the more puzzling, particularly 
as these same Songye chiefs were themselves fleeing from Arab harassment. 
 
Lumpungu: The Hunter and the Hunted 
The migration of Nsapu-Nsapu and his followers can be put into context when one 
considers the fate that befell Lumpungu and his followers. Despite his initial alliance 
with Tippu-Tip, Lumpungu was forced to leave his original base in what is present-
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day Kabinda because of Arab-Swahili slaving pressures.  Wissmann, writing in about 
December 1886, was told that: 
Mona Kakesa and Mona Lupungu had emigrated from the south-east, and 
that only the Bassonge chief Zappu stood his ground. This was the first 
report of inroads of the Arabs west of the Lomami, whose extended 
ravaging experiences we were soon to experience.41 
 
The nature of the relationships between local warlords is also thrown into question 
by this passage. Wissmann understood that it was Tippu-Tip and his 'hordes' who 
were responsible for displacing the Zappo-Zap and other warlord bands they had 
initially supported. Yet, subsequent scholars have asserted that it was Lumpungu and 
his subordinate, Mpania Mutombo, who were responsible for the attacks on the 
Zappo-Zap. Donatien Dibwe dia Mwembu and P. Timmermans both suggest that it 
was these warlords, and not Tippu-Tip, who targeted the Zappo-Zap and the Ben’eki. 
Dibwe dia Mwembu contends that Lumpungu and Mpania Mutombo were prompted 
to conduct increasingly far-reaching slave raids so as to increase their personal 
wealth in the forms of slaves and ivory, a substantial proportion of which was 
earmarked for their patron Tippu-Tip.42 This would suggest that, contrary to 
Wissmann's account of 1886-7, Lumpungu still enjoyed the favour of his Arab 
patrons and was permitted a level of autonomy in order to extract resources from 
the eastern Kasai region and maximise personal profits. Timmerman's also regards 
Lumpungu and Mpania Mutombo as the perpetrators of the assaults on the Zappo-
Zap and other Songye groups, yet descries their action as having been motivated 
solely by the need to ‘satisfaire aux exigences des Arabes’.43 
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Some of the primary evidence, however, seems to suggest that Lumpungu had 
indeed antagonised the Arabs and was being pursued by followers of Tippu-Tip. 
Wissmann recorded that Lumpungu had provoked Tippu-Tip's wrath by not paying 
tribute and seeking an alliance with Famba, a rival Arab merchant to the west of the 
Lomami, who contested Tippu-Tip's dominance in the region.44 Having paid tribute to 
Famba, Lumpungu had refused to also remunerate Tippu-Tip for his dues, and so was 
attacked by Tippu's subordinate army: 
He had retreated to his friend Mona Kakesa, and being pursued even here 
by Tibbu's hordes, those two, after the loss of many lives, emigrated to the 
south on the boundary of the Belande, leaving many prisoners as slaves in 
the hands of their assailants. The hosts of Arabs, never minding their 
enemies, but only eager to obtain slaves and ivory, proceeded to the 
Benecki, who at every approach of the robbers fled into the forests. The 
Zappu Zapp of the west had, as we know, fled to the Sankurru.45 
 
Le Marinel gives evidence that supports the view that Lumpungu was in retreat from 
Tippu-Tip's raiding bands. His record of his first meeting with Lumpungu, on 17th 
March 1887, reads as follows: 
Nous arrivons aux campements de Lupungu et de Mona-Kankeza, car on ne 
peut donner le nom de village à leurs huttes provisoires, à ces retraites de 
ces tribus aux abois, qui sont traquées par les bandes des Arabes ou des 
Arabises du Maleba.46 
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Indeed, the persecution of Lumpungu seems to have been a long-term affair: 
Lumpungu and his followers were apparently exposed to such extreme levels of 
trauma while being hunted down that Wissmann noticed that a process of 
brutalisation had occurred since his previous meeting with the warlord in 1882. 
[Lumpungu] was likewise changed from his former modest and amiable 
deportment: his constant persecution during the last few years had made 
him restless and savage in a way that he had not been formerly [...] The 
proceedings in this large camp were barbarous and wild, as might be 
expected under these warlike circumstances, for a troop of Tibbu Tibb's 
was said to be stationed but two days' journey from here in order to attack 
this camp. The force was sure to be very strong, and the Basongye had 
quite made up their minds not to fight, but to flee at the approach of the 
enemy.47 
 
Le Marinel still described Lumpungu as a vassal of the Arabs. But he also stressed 
that the same Lumpungu was determined fully to emancipate himself from those 
whom he presented as the warlord’s ‘persecuteurs et maîtres.’  
Lupungu n'a nullement signe la paix avec les Arabes. Il a toujours peur d'une 
attaque de Sefu, le fils de Mutchiputa (Tippo-Tipp). Lupungu compte même 
fuir vers le Sankuru si les Arabes continuent à le traquer, et il ira alors, à son 
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The Zappo-Zap’s Migration to Luluabourg 
In 1886, Wissmann suggested that the Zappo-Zap had abandoned their traditional 
home, M’penge, and moved to the Sankuru/Lubilash four years earlier. As we know, 
he believed that Nsapu-Nsapu had ‘been turned out of his old home by the rapacious 
expeditions of Tibbu Tibb’s slave-hunters.’49 This seems to conflict with other 
accounts of the origins of the migration that would eventually lead the Zappo-Zap to 
resettle in Luluabourg in the late 1880s. On the basis of Wolf's encounters with 
Nsapu-Nsapu, Timmerman dated the Zappo-Zap flight to the Lubilash to late 1884 or 
early in 1885.50 His hypothesis is confirmed by Le Marinel, who included the 
following passage in a letter he wrote to Wissmann from Ben’eki country on 10th 
May 1887:  
From Lubefu, where I encamped in the same place that you did, I took a 
south-westerly direction, and reached within four days a group of four or 
six villages of the Ku-Mapenge; they formerly belonged to Zappu Zapp, 
having since his departure made themselves independent. According to my 
calculation, Zappu Zapp must have left his old domicile in 1884.51 
 
Adopting a more local perspective, the Ben’eki traditions recorded by Fairley explain 
the Zappo-Zap migration in domestic terms, as the result of an unsuccessful bid for 
the Nkole, rather than the consequence of external slaving pressures. In fact, given 
the role played by the Arab-supported Lumpungu in the affair, the two factors do not 
exclude one another and are, in fact, eminently compatible. The death of Kasongo IV 
in c. 1882 was followed by a succession dispute between Kakesa and Budia. The 
former was installed with the support of Lumpungu, who was now strong enough 
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regionally to act as king-maker.  The newly crowned Kakesa was then challenged by 
Nsapu-Nsapu, who was supported by other Ben’eki sub-groups, who resented the 
depredations that had accompanied Lumpungu’s earlier involvement in the clash 
between Kakesa and Budia.  The Ben’eki civil war involving chief Nsapu-Nsapu can be 
tentatively dated to about 1883.52 
 
The initial clash, in keeping with the oral interpretation, led to the defeat of the 
Zappo-Zap army and a subsequent retreat to Basanga territory, in the north-western 
region of Songye territory. This region, as previously mentioned, was ruled over by 
Mpania Mutombo, a staunch ally of Lumpungu. It is thus plausible that Lumpungu 
and Mpania Mutombo conducted joint attacks on the Zappo-Zap in Basanga in c. 
1884-85. Yet, it seems more likely that it was Mpania Mutombo and his followers 
who harried the Zappo-Zap from this point onwards: in his Carnets de Route, Le 
Marinel mentions three times that it was Mpania who was responsible for chasing 
chief Nsapu-Nsapu.53 The Belgian Catholic missionary Constant de Deken, who 
settled with the Scheutists in the Kasai between 1892 and 1896, also points to 
Mpania, in contrast to Lumpungu, as being largely responsible for harassing the 
Zappo-Zap. Mpania, he wrote ‘lui prit tous ses biens, toutes ses femmes, et finit par le 
tuer.’54 However, the reliability of Deken's writing is questionable: we know that 
Mpania did not kill the old Nsapu-Nsapu, who actually died in Luluabourg, as 
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Understandably, the Zappo-Zap continued to advance westwards, in flight from the 
Songye warlords. By 1886, as we already know, Wolf met them on the right bank of 
the Lubilash (lower Sankuru River). They were thus still within Songye territory, 
although on its extreme western border. Le Marinel provides the next piece of 
information regarding the migration of Nsapu-Nsapu and his followers. Writing to 
Wissmann in May 1887, he explained that the Zappo-Zap had changed their position 
since encountering Wolf: they now resided on the left bank of the Sankuru.56 It is 
likely that the Zappo-Zap had attacked Baluba peoples in the Sankuru valley and that 
they now lived off of the land with those resources.57 At the same time, Le Marinel 
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was also keen to stress that he had found 
Zappu Zapp not nearly so powerful as I had conjectured; his reputation is 
greatly exaggerated by his people and his enemies. Though he may be 
called a formidable chief, he is not to be compared to Lumpungu, Mona 
Kakesa, and Mona Kialo. He has subdued many people, but this was not 
difficult, as they had none of them any firearms. 
 
In his most recent work on Kuba history, Jan Vansina dates the relocation of the 
Zappo-Zap to Luluabourg to 1889.58 Yet the evidence in our possession rather 
supports Jean-Luc Vellut's assertion that the Zappo-Zap were first introduced to the 
vicinity of Luluabourg in 1887.59 The move may have been a gradual one, though, as 
Le Marinel did not want to place exceeding pressure on food supplies and cause a 
famine.60 It seems that the old chief Nsapu-Nsapu, accompanied by 100 of his 
people, was in the first wave of migration; he was dying and claimed that he wanted 
to see the European settlement before he died.61 Le Marinel recorded this 
information under his diary entry for the 7th or 8th of January 1888 in hindsight: he 
was recalling the ways in which Nsapu-Nsapu and his people had entered the region, 
but ‘sans pouvoir preciser la date.’62 Captain de Macar, who presided over 
Luluabourg at this time, provides a more precise chronological detail, recording on 
23 August 1887 that the ‘famous’ Zappo-Zap (which could only refer to the 'old' 
Zappo-Zap chief Nsapu-Nsapu - his son and successor not having yet gained regional 
prominence) had sent porters to announce his visit to Luluabourg and his intention 
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of becoming a ‘vassal’ of the Europeans.63 We can assume that these groups of 
Zappo-Zap men stayed in the vicinity of Luluabourg in order to negotiate the later 
phases of their move. Le Marinel, in an entry dated 27 September 1887, asserts that: 
Ces gens de Zappo s'installent sur un plateau entre la station et le village de 
Pinda-Kambala, et paraissent faire un bon travail. Ils prétendent toujours 
que Zappo-Zapp arrivera prochainement avec tout son monde.64 
 
Le Marinel's account of the establishment of the Zappo-Zap in Luluabourg places 
great emphasis on the role of the Europeans as messianic figures, ready to lend a 
‘civilising’ hand to the harassed Zappo-Zap. The Ben’eki oral tradition, on the other 
hand, posits that Nsapu-Nsapu appealed to Kalamba, newly appointed as paramount 
of the Bena Lulua by the Europeans, for protection from the Songye marauders.65 
Timmermans also credits Kalamba with extending Nsapu-Nsapu and his followers an 
invitation to seek shelter in his territory to the west of the Sankuru river and 
establish a new settlement there.66 It is the purpose of the next chapter to explore 
the subsequent relationship between Kalamba and the Zappo-Zap, in the context of 
the imposition of colonial control in the Kasai. 
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HEMP-SMOKING AND POWER STRUGGLES 
 
 
This chapter seeks to explore the early relationships between Congo Free State 
posts, on the one hand, and African authorities in the Kasai region, on the other. 
Special emphasis is placed on Kalamba, a chief of the Bena Lulua, to the west of the 
Sankuru river, and the Zappo-Zap. The rise and demise of the collaborative liaison 
between Kalamba and CFS agents in the region casts important light, not only on the 
process of transition to European colonialism, but also on the deep roots of 
contemporary 'tribal' tension between the Bena Lulua, considered the 'original' 
inhabitants of the area, and such 'foreign' ethnic groups as the Luba-Kasai.1 Despite 
the subject’s obvious importance, Martens’ unpublished PhD thesis is still the only 
scholarly work to have examined in some detail the workings of the Kalamba-CFS 
partnership and the former’s gradual loss of status to the advantage of such 
transplanted groups as the Luba migrants and, indeed, the Zappo-Zap.2 Building upon 
Martens’ analysis, this chapter begins by charting the development of Kalamba's 
relationship with the Europeans. The emergence of tensions and the Zappo-Zap’s 
related rise to prominence are next addressed. 
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Kalamba and the Bena Lulua 
The Bena Lulua, also known as the Bashilange, are an ethnic group which developed 
from Luba ancestry. Writing in 1885, Charles Bateman, a British Lieutenant and CFS 
officer, neatly described these Bena Lulua peoples thus: 
they form that portion of the nation known as Bashilange, and are a distinct 
tribe from the Baluba properly so called, who inhabit a country to the east 
of the Sankoro, and between the seventh and eighth parallels of the south 
latitude, from which the Bashilange have migrated at no very remote 
period to their present domains, which extend westwards from the 
Sankoro to the Kasai. The people whom they have probably displaced by 
thus intruding into the country to the west of their original home are the 
Bakete, the remnants of which nation, divided into two very unequal 
portions, now occupy widely separated strips of the country, between 
which the great bulk of the Bashilange population is to be found.1 
However, while Bateman suggests that the migrations occurred at ‘no very remote 
period’, African historian Baudouin Mwamba Mputu suggests that the resettlement 
occurred in a series of movements spread over a span of 250 years, between c. 1600 
and 1850.2 
 
The Bena Lulua were not organized into a kingdom comparable to that of their Luba-
Katanga ancestors. Before the European intervention, there was no king or 
paramount equivalent to the Luba Mulopwe. Indeed, it would be misleading to 
assume that Kalamba Mukenge was the paramount of the Bena Lulua before 
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Wissmann and the first CFS representatives created the office. In the late 1870s, 




Map 7. 'The Peoples of Kasai and Katanga Around 1890', in Jan Vansina, Kingdoms of the Savanna 
(University of Wisconsin Press: Madison, 1966), between pages 167-168. 
HEMP-SMOKING AND POWER STRUGGLES 
65 
 
As yet I don't know the borders of the Kasselange [...] Many big chiefs rule 
in the Kasselange land, such as Kalamba Mukenge, Kingenge, and so on. To 
these the smaller  
chiefs owe tribute, as much as in Lunda country. Every village, or several 
together, form, so to speak, a family; the inhabitants consider themselves, 
as it were, related and stick together through thick and thin [...] The people 
living at Mukenge's residence belong to the Bena Katschia.1 
 
Kalamba Mukenge was a leader of the Bena Katschia people, who were a minority 
group within the Bena Lulua settlers.2 The majority group was headed by Mwana 
Mputu, who had founded a hemp-smoking religious cult. Kalamba's father created a 
similar religious sect to rival this, which Kalamba inherited in 1873, after the death of 
his elder brother.3 The cult, Lubuku, was considered a ‘symbole de la nouvelle 
société’ and emphasised a hospitable and open attitude towards strangers.4 Thanks 
to his heading of Lubuku, analogous to a spiritual institution among the Bena Lulua, 
Kalamba thus possessed a strong degree of ideological legitimacy as leader. This 
position was not held by him alone, as his sister Sangula seems to have been highly 
influential in the practice of Lubuku. Remarking on this power-sharing agreement, 
Johannes Fabian asserted that Kalamba ‘was the leader and chief arbitrator’, while 
Sangula ‘was the principal ideologist and ritual specialist: there was no noticeable 
hierarchy to come between the leaders and their followers.’5 In fact, several 
contemporary European accounts seem to strongly suggest that it was Sangula who 
held the balance of power over their Bena Lulua followers. Wissmann, who had built 
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a close friendship with the two siblings during his extensive travels in their company, 
to be shortly discussed, recognised Sangula as the agent wielding the greater amount 
of political power, stating that ‘Sangula Meta, the high-priestess of the Riamba 
worship [...] had great influence over her brother’.6  
 
The unpublished diary of Adolphe de Macar, the Commander of Luluabourg from 
1886, also presents Sangula as the real power behind Kalamba. Kalamba, de Macar 
noted after his first meeting with the two leaders, was under the control of his sister, 
who was always followed by her slaves.7 Gillain, Commissaire de district Lualaba-
Kasai, further corroborates this claim in his journal dating to 1894-95. Kalamba's 
power was great, Gillain wrote, because of his sister.8 Unfortunately, not much more 
than these tantalizing glimpses is known about Sangula. The rest of this chapter is 
thus limited to discussing Kalamba in relation to developments in the region at the 
outset of European penetration; the existing evidence does not allow for a fuller 
discussion of the political will or impact of Sangula.  
 
The Growth of Trade and Kalamba’s Rise to Prominence 
Kalamba ascended to regional prominence through his establishment of a trading 
relationship with Chokwe and Luso-Africans from present-day Angola. The Chokwe, 
as previously examined, had been advancing northwards in search of ivory and 
rubber resources to satisfy the demands of the Angolan market. According to 
Carvalho, a Portuguese officer and the commander of a Portuguese expedition to the 
Lunda heartland in 1884-88, the first contact between Chokwe traders and 
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Kalamba’s Bena Lulua took place in 1866.9 Kalamba received guns in exchange for 
‘quelques’ slaves. This established a ‘traffic régulier’ between the two parties, with 
Kalamba receiving supplies of firearms, gunpowder, cloth and metal objects, in 
return for slaves, ivory and rubber.10 Yet, at this point, the volume of trade was not 
so great as to ensure Kalamba’s regional ascendancy; other Bena Lulua chiefs, after 
all, had begun to trade with the Chokwe at the same time as he did.11 Nonetheless, a 
steady trade was established: Kalamba supplied slaves (later also providing ivory and 
rubber) in return for firearms and other European articles.12 The Chokwe gained from 
this arrangement greatly. Bateman even surmised that the aforementioned hemp-
smoking cult had actually originated from the Chokwe in an attempt to foster 
friendship with the Bena Lulua, thereby implying that the Bena Lulua conducted an 
informal policy of cultural borrowing from their stronger partners.13 Indeed, the 
name Kalamba itself was an import from Chokwe society, which had then 
transmuted into a dynastic name.14 The importance of the Chokwe in Bena Lulua 
affairs was acknowledged by Wissmann, who through his long-standing friendship 
with the Bena Lulua had developed an informed insight into their culture and history. 
He noticed that the ‘Kioque Mukanjanga [leader of the Chokwe] was the patron of 
the new [Lulua] chiefs, and, making a base use of his position, he always enriched 
himself.’15 
 
                                                             
9 Miller, 'Cokwe Trade', p. 196; Libata, 'Regroupement des balubas', p. 101. The first 
introduction of Chokwe trading to the area is dated to 1865 by Luadia-Luadia, 'Les Luluwa', p. 
61. 
10 A.  Van Zandijcke, Pages d'Histoire, p. 17. 
11 Vansina, Kingdoms, p. 220. 
12 Miller, 'Chokwe Trade', p. 182-3. 
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 Bateman, The First Ascent, p. 112. 
14 Luadia-Luadia, 'Les Luluwa', p. 94; Libata, 'Regroupement des balubas', p. 101. 
15 Wissmann, My Second Journey, p. 313. 
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 A significant shift in terms of Kalamba's commercial relations occurred with his 
decision to actively seek a greater role with his trading counterparts. In 1875, 
Kalamba and his retinue travelled down the Mbuji Mayi river to Mona Kimbundu, a 
commercial hub located in present day north-eastern Angola.16 The journey itself 
warranted him a level of respect amongst his own followers in his homeland: this act 
of valour and bravery was interpreted as a sign of Kalamba’s ‘modernity’, and it 
increased his prestige among the Bena Lulua.17 This journey, and the firearms 
subsequently accessed, allowed Kalamba to be ‘universally acknowledged as the 
head of all hemp-smokers.’18 Furthermore, the contacts he made at Mona Kimbundu 
opened the way for the establishment of direct trading and diplomatic relationships 
between Kalamba's people and the Europeans. Such contacts were to greatly 
enhance his standing as a regional African power. It was at Mona Kimbundu that 
Kalamba met the German explorer, Dr. Paul Pogge, and came into direct contact with 
Portuguese traders from the Angolan coast, such as Saturnino de Souza Machado, 
with whom he developed enduring commercial relations.19 It was Saturnino who 
established what would soon become the major trading post at Kalamba's capital, 
Mukenge, on the Lulua River.20 
 
Charles Bateman asserts that the trading centre was successful from the start, as 
Saturnino and his trading partner, Senhor Carvalho, were ‘determined to [...] 
introduce a considerable quantity of merchandise into the Baluba [Kasai] country [...] 
and thus able to establish a permanent trading station in the interior by seizing upon 
                                                             
16 Vansina, Kingdoms, p. 220-1; Mwamba Mputu, Le Congo-Kasai, p. 48. 
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18 Wissmann, My Second Journey, p. 313. 
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the advantage of being the first to enter the newly opened country.’21  Indeed by 
1887, de Macar put the number of Angolan traders residing in Kalamba's village at 
63, with their total entourage consisting of 532 more people.22 A by-product of this 
fast-developing trade was the rapid influx of firearms into Kalamba's domain. This 
was viewed as a dangerous development by Chokwe caravans, who, in 1878, tried 
unsuccessfully to circumvent Kalamba's market with a view of preventing him from 
forming a dangerous trade monopoly.23 Indeed the volume of trade was so great that 
Kalamba became the most heavily armed Bena Lulua chief by 1886, owning 150 guns 
distributed amongst his entourage. His closest Bena Lulua rival, Tshinkenke is 
reported to have owned 100.24 This seems a conservative estimate, however. On 
their first arrival to Kalamba’s village in 1881, Pogge and Wissmann estimated the 
village to comprise of a minimum of two thousand inhabitants, possessing more than 
one thousand firearms.25 In 1886, de Macar went as far as suggesting that Kalamba 
might have owned as many as nearly two thousand firearms.26   
 
Early Relationship with the Europeans 
The flourishing of the new market in Kalamba's domain attracted the interest of 
Wissmann and Pogge, whom Kalamba had met previously in Mona Kimbundu. In the 
autumn of 1881, in their journey from Angola to the eastern coast, they were guided 
to the commercial centre by one of Saturnino's men. Kalamba took full advantage of 
the opportunity afforded to him and swiftly worked to establish a strong bond with 
the Europeans. The relationship had both a spiritual and a politico-economic 
dimension. The spiritual endorsement consisted of the proclamation that Wissmann 
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and Pogge were reincarnations of close family members,27 a recurring theme in the 
early history of Euro-African contact. On a practical level, the friendship and 
collaboration was cemented by a series of journeys which Kalamba and his retinue 
undertook in the company of Wissmann and his various European companions.  
 
In December 1881, Kalamba, Sangula and a number of Bena Lulua porters 
accompanied Pogge and Wissmann to the Arab stronghold of Nyangwe.28 Thereafter, 
while Wissmann continued to the eastern coast with the help of the Arabs, Pogge 
and his Bena Lulua escorts retraced their step to the Lulua region, which they re-
entered in July 1882. Pogge then built a station in present-day Kananga; two years 
later, this was rebuilt and renamed Luluabourg. In 1884, Wissmann, now working for 
Leopold, returned with Wolf to the Bena Lulua, his ‘old friends and travelling 
companions.’29 It was at this time that the relationship between Kalamba and 
Wissmann was formalized through a Lubuku blood pact. This set the connection 
between Kalamba and the Europeans within a formal framework of alliance.30 
Following the stipulation of this alliance, Kalamba and his entourage helped 
Wissmann and Wolf explore the Kasai, from May to November 1885. What should be 
stressed at this point is the mutuality of the alliance. As pointed out by Mwana 
Mputu31, it would be a mistake to regard this alliance as an early instance of indirect 
rule – the practice of installing Africans as 'traditional' chiefs of a categorized ethnic 
group. The embryonic CFS depended on Kalamba as much as Kalamba needed the 
State. Kalamba and the Bena Lulua had established independent links with the 
Portuguese and the Chokwe, and Leopold’s remote representatives relied heavily on 
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autochthonous support. Their weakness meant they could be easily manipulated, 
particularly considering that: 
Until 1890 there were never more than two or three State officers in the 
area including Luebo and this placed the State in the position of having to 
depend on Kalamba, who, in turn, had gained power as a result of being 
supported by the State Luluabourg.32 
 
Indeed, militarily, the support of Kalamba was indispensable in the early years of the 
CFS. Even by November 1886, Luluabourg station had ‘not got one single man 
capable of handling a gun.’ Luebo had only six Zanzibari soldiers stationed there at 
that time. The presence of these state forces, without the aid of Kalamba, provided 
little defence against Luso-African slave traders ‘armed to the teeth and with plenty 
of ammunition.’33 Furthermore, Kalamba's co-operation and support was politically 
vital at this stage to secure the Bena Lulua territory for the CFS, whose claims to the 
region remained contested by Portugal until 1891. 
 
The Recognition of Kalamba as Paramount 
The State's reliance on Kalamba was such that, by May 1886, Wissmann was clearly 
planning on installing Kalamba as the paramount of the Bena Lulua peoples, largely, 
one assumes, because of the personal nature of their Lubuku pact. In his published 
account, Wissmann shows awareness that his comrade Kalamba was only one of the 
main chiefs of the Bena Lulua, but he also expressed his hopes to have ‘arranged 
political affairs’ so that the handover of the Luluabourg station to Le Marinel and de 
Macar on 22nd May 1886 would be simplified by the ‘new commanders’ having ‘in 
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future only […] to negotiate with Kalamba, the upper chief’.34 Indeed, eight years 
later, Gillain ascribed Kalamba’s advancement to the assistance he had lent the 
Europeans during the early explorations of the region and the founding of State 
settlements. The Europeans at Luluabourg were indebted to Kalamba and 
consequently treated him as an equal in all affairs.35  
 
Kalamba's ambition, with the assistance of Wissmann (and other European agents of 
the CFS), had enabled him to consolidate his domination over the whole of the Bena 
Lulua, to the detriment of his competitors. A total of thirty six Bena Lulua chiefs 
recognised Kalamba’s sovereignty, agreeing to pay regular tribute payments to him.36 
This is borne out especially clearly by Wissmann's account, where it is revealed that 
the German – acting as an agent of the CFS – had at one point flirted with the idea of 
backing other chiefs of the Bena Lulua, should such alliances provide greater 
advantages than a partnership with Kalamba would. 
In Lubuku, the country of the hemp-smoking Bashilange, my tactics had 
always been to keep the natives separated into two parties, so as in case of 
need to lead one against the other. I had made Kalamba and Chingenge 
[Tshinkenke] chiefs of the two parties. Experience had taught me these 
tactics, which always made the management of the natives difficult, were 
necessary no longer. This had been made evident to me during the two 
long journeys with the chief of the Lubuku Bashilange, so that I resolved 
upon a single control of the natives. There could naturally be no doubt as to 
who was to be the chief dependent on me or my successor. Kalamba was 
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the mightiest, the most respected, and, above all, the most devoted of all 
the princes of Lubuku  
[...] 
I now began [...] to make the greater chiefs, the eldest members of a family 
called Baqua or Bena, responsible masters of the districts allotted to them 
[...] Each of the chiefs was to have a star flag, and all of these flags were to 
be placed under the large union flag of Kalamba's. The latter, to whom a 
certain, not too large tribute (mulambo) was to be paid by the chiefs only, 
was to engage himself always to supply warriors for any chance campaign, 
conductors for a journey, labourers for keeping the roads clear, &c.37 
 
Immediately prior to Kalamba's appointment, Wissmann had already conducted joint 
activities with Kalamba to subdue chiefs who had been problematic – either 
politically or economically – in the region. One such example is made by Wissmann in 
April 1886: 
Before riding back to the station I met Katende, the chief of the Bashi 
Lamboa, whom a year ago I had defeated and taken prisoner, together with 
Kalamba. He had come to pay tribute to the latter, and was complaining of 
the extortionate demand. After a short interview with Kalamba I arranged 
about the remaining amount, and got leave for him to return home.38 
 
The decision to recognize Kalamba as 'Chief of the Bena Lulua' meant that the 
Europeans were now inclined to defend their ally’s newly-acquired position. This, in 
turn, led to greater military involvement in local affairs by CFS officials. Indeed it was 
the ‘business’ of State officers at Luluabourg, Bateman records, ‘to receive, or more 
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correctly to enforce […] submission and homage’ of the Lulua chiefs to Kalamba.39 In 
his unpublished journal, de Macar documents the refusal of ‘Tshilunga-Maissau’, a 
Bena Lulua chief, to submit to Kalamba's authority in August 1886. Instead,  
‘Tshilunga-Maissau’ declared war on Kalamba, raiding and then setting fire to one of 
his villages. De Macar gathered a company of men armed with guns and went to 
subdue the rebel chief on behalf of Kalamba. The threat of state violence was 
enough to deter the war; the Europeans, in this instance, acted as peace-brokers.40 
The discord lasted for under a month, with Wissmann accompanying ‘Tshilunga-
Maissau’ on 4th September to submit to Kalamba.41 
 
An earlier incident provides another illustration of the extent to which the European 
intrusion was affecting the local balance of power, enhancing the standing of some 
leaders to the detriment of others. Writing to Bateman on 26th June 1886, Le Marinel 
urged the former – who was then stationed at the Luebo post –to prepare for a 
‘military demonstration against the people at Biombe, the Chiplumba-Bashilange 
town, or rather towns, situated between the Kasai and Lulua rivers, some three 
hours' march from Luebo’. The people of Biombe were said to be in open defiance of 
state control.42 The responsibility for their attitude was attributed to the Chokwe, 
who had ‘lost no time in representing to the Chiplumba that the authorities of the 
Congo State came into the country for the one purpose of imposing taxes and 
oppressing the aborigines [...] which [...] produced the immediate result of that 
hostility toward ourselves’ and Kalamba, as an ally of the Europeans.43 The 
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commercial and political rise of Kalamba in the region threatened the interests of the 
Chokwe who, as we know, had previously played a dominant role in the area. 
Wissmann himself wrote that ‘since we had settled here, the time of [Chokwe] 
predominancy over our Bashilange was over.’44 This clash of interests between the 
State and the Chokwe set the scene for a long-standing confrontation between the 
two parties – one that, as will be considered shortly, may have ended up affecting 
Kalamba and led him to reconsider his earlier political choices.  
 
Kalamba and the Zappo-Zap 
Kalamba’s position could not have been more different from that of the Zappo-Zap. 
Kalamba continued to cultivate his trading networks with the Chokwe to the west, 
and he could also draw on the firearms bestowed upon him by his European 
partners. On his first visit to Kalamba in June 1886, de Macar presented a revolver 
both to the chief and the latter’s son and heir, alongside a number of cartridges. 
State representatives evidently had little qualms about arming their ally, as they 
considered it in their best interest. The strength of Kalamba through these 
partnerships grew to such an extent that, in 1891, he was able to repel Ngongo 
Luteta from the eastern border of his territory when the latter attempted to 
establish communications with the Chokwe gun traders based among the Bena 
Lulua.45 
 
However, the Zappo-Zap, as previously established, had arrived in the region in the 
mid 1880s as refugees after being chased from their homeland. The death of Nsapu-
Nsapu in 1887, shortly after reaching Luluabourg, had shook the cohesion of the 
refugees. Nsapu-Nsapu's son, named Zappo-Zap in European documents, succeeded 
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him at the young age of 16 or 17.46 The inexperience of their young leader and the 
foreignness of their new residence meant that the Zappo-Zap were heavily 
dependent on the Europeans.47 Le Marinel was quick to predict as early as April 1888 
that this circumstance could be used to the CFS’s advantage: 
...la situation de ces nouveaux indigènes, très différents des Bachilenge du 
pays, était définitivement réglés. C'était en quelque sorte une armée 
auxiliaire aux portes même de la station, car, étrangers eux-mêmes, leurs 
seuls amis étaient les Blancs et leur personnel [...] Le chef de la station de 
Luluaburg peut en espérer de grands services.48 
Former officer Verdick would later even go so far as to suggest that the Zappo-Zap 
were introduced into Luluabourg as a counter-power to the strength of Kalamba, 
should he ever turn against the State.49 
 
There seems, however, to have been an initial reluctance on the part of the Zappo-
Zap to put down their roots in the Luluabourg vicinity. De Macar recorded on 22 
September 1887 that some people of Zappo-Zap had departed from Luluabourg in an 
attempt to return to their homeland across the Sankuru, only to come back the next 
day because the route had proved impassable.50 The choice of whether or not to 
settle permanently in Luluabourg was further exacerbated by an internal rift 
between the young Zappo-Zap and his brother. As late as January 1890, the latter 
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was still opposed to the young Zappo chief's attempt to seek official approval from 
the Commander of Luluabourg for his group’s relocation towards the direction of 
their Ben’eki homeland.51 The ‘très ancienne querrelle’ between these brothers can 
be interpreted as a succession crisis, since both parties are likely to have vied for the 
leadership of the breakaway Ben’eki faction to which they belonged. The rivalry 
between the brothers escalated to the extent that Zappo-Zap fractured his brother's 
tibia in a fight, to the dismay of the Europeans, who considered such behaviour an 
embarrassing display of savagery.52 
 
The new leader also had another problem to contend with. His authority over the 
Zappo-Zap people was seen as illegitimate and open to contention as long as his late 
father's body remained in Luluabourg and not his birthplace, M'Penge:  ‘c'est là le 
grand souci de tous ses instants et, tant qu'il n'aura pas enterré là-bas les restes du 
vieux Zappo, il ne sera pas considéré comme le vrai chef des Beneki-Massenge.’53 
However, as the Zappo-Zap had already discovered, the journey back to M’penge 
was unfeasible at that time due to the intense slave trade-related violence that 
prevailed to the west of the Sankuru river. To add to the new chief’s hardship, the 
late Nsapu-Nsapu's mother, Zappo-Zap’s grandmother, is reported not to have 
accepted the demise of her son. According to Le Marinel she insisted that he and de 
Macar bring her son back to life, so as to prevent her grandsons from ‘eating’ each 
other.54 Regardless of whether this was an expression of grief and distress, or 
whether the resurrection request was rooted in cultural symbolism, this line of 
thinking made the young Zappo-Zap’s quest for legitimacy even more problematic.  
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Zappo-Zap’s grandmother was then residing with Kalamba and Sangula. On 19 
February 1890, she is reported to have told her grandson that Sangula was a former 
friend of her late son, who had recognised her as the master of the land. It was 
because of her and Kalamba, she continued, that Nsapu-Nsapu knew the white men: 
thus the Bena Lulua rulers deserved respect.55 Indeed, it is true that the core tenant 
of the Lubuku cult was hospitality to foreigners: opening their country  ‘to all 
strangers who wished to maintain amicable intercourse and trade with its 
inhabitants.’56 The Ben’eki oral traditions as collected by Fairley, furthermore, claim 
that the chief Nsapu-Nsapu had petitioned Kalamba for shelter from their Songye 
persecutors, and not the accompanying European officers.57 This fragmentary 
evidence lends credence to the view that, upon settling in Luluabourg, Nsapu-Nsapu 
had submitted to Kalamba in return for the protection of his people and that the 
then chief’s mother had been requested to reside with Kalamba as a hostage to 
ensure the new arrivals’ obedience and good behaviour.   
 
This perception of submission to Kalamba was to cause friction in the interactions 
between the Bena Lulua, the CFS and their protégées-in-the-making, the Zappo-Zap. 
As has been previously alluded to, the young Zappo-Zap leader drew closer to his 
European mentors in an attempt to balance his inexperience. The Zappo-Zap, to be 
sure, regarded themselves as ‘the special friends and allies of the white man’ and 
had quickly immersed themselves in European culture. They made every effort to 
imitate the architecture of the Europeans’ homesteads, learn to speak French and 
English, use imported cutlery and utensils, and ‘get full suits of European clothing.’58 
The speed of these adaptations is a sure sign of increasing alignment with the 
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Europeans, particularly considering the clear Arab-Swahili cultural leanings that Wolf 
had identified among the Zappo-Zap 1886.59 Le Marinel even boasted on 13th April 
1890 that ‘le jeune Zappo m'écoute religieusement’, and that, if he were permanently 
stationed at Luluabourg, he would be able to bring to an end the quarrels within the 
Zappo-Zap elite. 60 
 
This internal political tension amongst the Zappo-Zap royalty was regarded by Le 
Marinel as dangerous; there was the concern that the course of action favoured by 
the young Zappo-Zap would provoke Kalamba.61 Indeed it is possible that by insisting 
on returning to M’penge in order to become the legitimately recognised chief, the 
young Zappo was bent on extricating himself and his followers from Kalamba’s 
custody and authority. If that was indeed the young Zappo’s objective, the European 
desire to see Nsapu-Nsapu’s mother returned to her people must have made this 
clear to Kalamba. It is certainly suggestive that the first act of open defiance of 
European authority on the part of Kalamba took place early in 1890, when Captain 
Braconnier, de Macar’s replacement in Luluabourg, visited the Bena Lulua leader 
officially to request the return of Nsapu’s mother. Kalamba reacted by throwing 
pepper in Braconnier's eyes and by ordering the limbs of his interpreter to be 
broken.62 
 
The clash between Kalamba and Bracconier suggests that relationships between the 
Lulua potentate and his CFS sponsors were rapidly deteriorating. Indeed in 1892, the 
body of old Nspau-Nsapu, having been preserved by his people, was escorted back to 
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M'Penge by the State. His funeral procession was grand and attended by 
approximately 1,300-1,400 people, including representatives of the other important 
Songye groups, such as Lumpungu's  Beekalebue and the Basanga headed by Mpania 
Mutombo.63 This is particularly significant, as it indicates some level of truce 
between the Zappo-Zap and their former Songye persecutors, and the emergence of 
such a coalition of battle-tested militias in alliance with the State might well have 
been regarded by Kalamba as posing an unacceptable threat.64 
 
These developments were exacerbated by the takeover of the Luluabourg station by 
Belgian officers on 1 June 1886. Whilst Kalamba had established a strong relationship 
with the German explorer Wissmann over the space of five years, his appointment as 
paramount chief had been intended to facilitate a smooth takeover of the region by 
the incoming Belgian officers of the State. Yet, while the German officers had 
encouraged a horizontal power relationship based on mutuality, the Belgians took 
steps to transform their dealings with the Bena Lulua into a hierarchical system.65 In 
this sense, de Macar, the new commander of Luluabourg was held in low esteem by 
Wissmann, who deemed him incapable of communicating with the Africans.66 
Racialising influences were also at work: those ethnic groups more open to the 
adaptation of European culture were treated more favourably. To be sure, from 
Kalamba’s point of view, Le Marinel’s plan for the Zappo-Zap and the latter’s growing 
intimacy with ‘his’ whites must have been regarded as worrying developments.67  
 
                                                             
63 Le Marinel, in Timmermans, 'Les Sapo-Sapo', p. 34-35. 
64 By 1892, Kalamba had already turned against the State. Lumpungu and Mpania Mutombo 
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No less worrying for Kalamba was  the increasing influx of Luba refugees and 
migrants into the region. There had always been a Luba presence in the area, 
particularly when one considers  the Luba ancestry of the Bena Lulua themselves. 
However, beginning in ca. 1890, the traditional land of the Bena Lulua was being 
settled by further waves of Luba migrants who fled the depredations of such slave-
raiding warlords as Mpania Mutombo, Lumpungu and Ngongo Luteta. The scale of 
the phenomenon was such that, by 1894, the Luebo-based Rev. C. de Witt Snyder 
lamented that ‘you can not go anywhere in this part of the country and not find a 
Muluba; and, were it not that the state has taken control, not many years would pass 
before the Baluba would be the ruling tribe here on account of their numbers’68 
From 1895, moreover, the CFS embarked upon an informal policy of transplanting 
Luba peoples into the Luluabourg vicinity on a large scale: ’en deux or trois ans, des 
milliers et des milliers de gens affluerent sur la terre hospitaliere des Bena Lulua.’69 
Following in the footsteps of the Zappo-Zap, these Luba refugees were quick to 
ingratiate themselves with the Europeans: many settled at mission stations and 
converted to Christianity, or were integrated into the colonial framework as soldiers 
of the Force Publique. The beginning of Kalamba’s clash with the CFS corresponded 
with the influx of Luba-speaking refugees from the east. The parallel between the 
two developments is unlikely to be coincidental. Thus, without wanting to project 
'tribal' tensions in the Kasai backwards,70 it is still reasonable to conclude that the 
arrival of new groups in the region, and the forging of new alliances between them 
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and the CFS, threatened Kalamba’s recently gained prominence  and were thus 
important factors in changing the latter’s attitude towards the CFS.  
 
Other factors may well have contributed to push Kalamba towards the path of open 
resistance. Following Martens, it is possible to surmise that the inherent weakness of 
the State oriented Kalamba’s actions. In this reading, a critical event was the defeat 
experienced by the joint forces of Kalamba and the CFS at the hands of 3,000 
Chokwe slave traders in 1887, to the west of Luluabourg. This defeat might have 
alerted Kalamba to the vulnerability of the Europeans in the region.71 Indeed, 
according to Gillain, so ill-equipped and under-manned had state forces been at the 
time of this confrontation with the Chokwe that the State-allied troops were forced 
to retreat.72 Following this demonstration of Chokwe strength, Kalamba might have 
plausibly entertained the idea of throwing his lot in with his old allies, especially 
when the benefits of his union with the State began to dwindle. Certainly, by the 
early 1890s, the interests of the Chokwe and those of Kalamba had co-aligned, and 
the CFS was engaged in combat with both. The strength of this African alliance was 
such that, by May 1895, the State had to acknowledge the impossibility of 
administering the Bena Lulua country until this force had been subdued.73  
 
This reading of events is still partial and might be refined by further research. Indeed, 
what the above scenario does not fully clarify are the reasons that led Kalamba in 
1891 to open up his territory to Belgian Catholic missionaries of the Scheut 
congregation. The Mission of Saint Joseph-Mikalayi was established in August 1891, 
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at an estimated two and a half hours’ distance from Luluabourg.74 Its leader, Father 
Cambier arrived at Luluabourg on 24 November 1891, only two months after the 
State had engaged in direct warfare against Kalamba. A possible explanation is that 
Kalamba had learnt to differentiate between European agents of the State and the 
missionaries: by ‘insist[ing] on obtaining missionaries’ and selecting Cambier as a 
possible intermediary between the State and himself,75 he might have sought to 
keep his option open. The State and the Catholic missionary were indeed notoriously 
closely aligned; perhaps Kalamba, hoping for a restoration of harmony with the CFS, 
lent Saint Joseph-Mikalayi the critical initial support that the mission needed. 
According to Cambier’s philosophy for central African missions, 'liberated' slaves 
placed under missionary care would form the first nuclei of converts and the means 
to ensure African salvation. Thus it was that, his ongoing conflict with the CFS 
notwithstanding, Kalamba bestowed a number of clients and dependents upon 
Cambier. By April 1892, Cambier had accumulated a total number of 255 'liberated' 
slaves.76 Of course, Kalamba's support may have been calculated to gain further 
prestige in the region. Other chiefs soon followed Kalamba's suit, asking for Cambier 
to establish mission stations in their villages, paying Cambier homage and tribute 
items such as liberated slaves, goats and agricultural tools.77    
 
Whether the state’s bond with the Zappo-Zap was the cause or the consequence of 
the breakup of the ‘grand alliance’ between Kalamba and the CFS, the fact remains 
                                                             
74 Cambier to Clerbaux, 4 April 1892, in Émeri Cambier (eds. A. Cornet and F. Bontinck), Émeri 
Cambier. Correspondance du Congo (1888-1899): Un apprentissage missionnaire (Institut 
Historique Belge de Rome Bibliothèque: Rome, 2001), p. 307.  
75Ibid., p. 335; Bram Cleys and Bruno De Meulder, 'Imagining a Christian Territory: Changing 
Spatial Strategies in the Missionary Outposts of Scheut (Kasai, Congo, 1891-1940), in Fassil 
Demissie (ed.), Colonial Architecture and Urbanism in Africa: Intertwined and Contested 
Histories (Ashgate: Farnham, 2012), p. 205. 
76 Cambier to Clerbaux, 4 April 1892, in Cambier, Correspondance du Congo, p. 309. 
77 Mwamba Mputu, Le Congo-Kasaï , p. 108-9. 
HEMP-SMOKING AND POWER STRUGGLES 
84 
 
that, beginning in the first half of the 1890s, the Zappo-Zap lived up to Le Marinel’s 
original expectations. By then, the Zappo-Zap had wholly supplanted Kalamba. 
Fighting as auxiliaries alongside the FP, the Zappo-Zap confronted both the Chokwe 
and Kalamba’s Bena Lulua. The campaign, lasting from April to June 1895, saw ‘le 
chef Zapo-Zape et trois cents de ses hommes armés de fusils à piston’ at the vanguard 
of the State force, taking the brunt of the fighting.78 This was only one example of 
the ‘grands services’ that the Zappo-Zap rendered the State in repressing 
autochthonous dissent. Their successive experiences at the service of the state are 
examined in detail in the next chapter.  
 
                                                             






MUTINIES AND MUTILATIONS 
 
 
So far, this thesis has worked to place the CFS firmly within the context of Euro-
African relationships, and the influence of pre-existing polities. It is the aim of this 
chapter to focus more specifically on the mechanics of the Zappo-Zap collaboration 
with the State. Indeed, in the midst of regional tensions and rebellions, Zappo-Zap 
loyalty held steadfast to the extent they became an undeniable pillar of support in 
the Kasai, propping up State authority. It becomes apparent that the Zappo-Zap had 
more to gain from the State than the former Arab-ised ‘Batetela’ gunmen who had 
been incorporated into the Force Publique: the behaviour of the latter, unlike the 
Zappo-Zap, was restrained by the imposition of State discipline. The Zappo-Zap, 
however, were free to accumulate slaves and plunder, provided that they undertook 
the work necessary as military auxiliaries.  
 
This chapter is subdivided into five sections. The first examines the economy of the 
Kasai under the CFS, teasing out the changes wrought by the establishment of the 
Compagnie du Kasaï and exploring the workings of the commercial system into which 
Zappo-Zap ‘capitas’ were co-opted. The next section looks at the FP, the standing 
army of the CFS, and establishes the patchwork ethnic makeup of the force and, 
within this, the significance of the ‘Batetela’, who mostly consisted of former 
followers of Ngongo Luteta. The third section of this chapter scrutinises the Zappo-
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Zap role in the context of the 1895 revolt of these 'Batetela' FP soldiers. The 
penultimate section considers the infamous Pyaang Massacre as an example of State 
expectations of the Zappo-Zap and the reality of the brutally extractive policies of the 
CFS. Lastly, this chapter ponders over the ultimate reliability of the Zappo-Zap in the 
context of the Kuba rebellion of 1904.  
 
The Compagnie du Kasaï 
In the Kasai, no commercial monopoly was established until 1901, when the CK was 
formed. Before the establishment of the CK, there were numerous commercial 
companies that founded trading posts. Largely independent of the CFS,1 these 
conducted a thriving, market-driven trade with neighbouring African communities. 
The volume of trade on the right bank of the Kasai river, on the periphery of the 
Kuba kingdom, was such that, in 1898, Presbyterian missionary Samuel P. Verner 
referred to a location called ‘Traders' Hill’. This, he explained, was ‘a good example of 
[...] furious competition.’2 African experiences with these separate trading 
companies seem to have varied; yet it is clear that the atmosphere of commercial 
rivalry that prevailed in the free-trade zone of the Kasai ensured that the local 
populations gained good prices for their products, with the opportunity of choosing 
whom to sell their wares to.3 There is evidence that independent company agents 
were ‘very popular with the natives.’ For instance, Mr Stache, an agent of the Société 
Anonyme Belge (SAB) at Luebo, was called ‘Chibuia’ (Generous) by the local peoples, 
                                                             
1 In some cases, however, trading companies shouldered the responsibility for State posts. 
The Société Anonyme Belge, for example, oversaw the State post of Luebo from the mid-
1880s; see Martens, 'History of European Penetration', p. 108-9; Verner, Pioneering in Central 
Africa, p. 101.   
2 Verner, Pioneering in Central Africa, p. 88. 
3 Vansina, Being Colonized, p. 63-65. 
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revealing that European trade with Africans was not always wholly mercenary.4 
Before the inception of the CK’s monopoly, trade was voluntary and held at 
manageable levels that did not threaten local livelihoods. In 1896, for instance,  the 
total production of rubber in the Kasai amounted to 160 tonnes, not much more 
than ten percent of the total amount of rubber exported from the CFS in that same 
year.5  
 
In light of the above, and insofar at least as the Kasai in the 1890s is concerned, the 
term 'robber colonialism' to describe the workings of the CFS is misleading.6 In 
particular, it disguises the room for local agency that existed before the inception of 
the CK’s commercial monopoly and its system of violently enforced quotas. For 
instance, in the 1890s, there are examples of Africans using fraudulent means to 
obtain a higher profit margin; these included using sand, bark, and other natural 
debris to boost the weight of the rubber they sold, especially when the price per kilo 
rose.7 This is not to say that the trading companies that preceded the CK were  
innocuous and benevolent institutions, however. While trade with independent 
African communities was market-driven and bilateral, the plantations belonging to 
these companies profited from traditional institutions of slavery in the area. 
Labourers were paid wages, yet when such labourers were not freemen, their wages 
were given to their masters. For instance, Verner, speaking of the labourers at 
‘Gallikoko’, one of the first Kuba towns along the Kasai river near the Lulua river, in 
1898, pointed out: 
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There were five hundred of them there […] These laborers were chiefly 
Baluba slaves of the Zappo-Zaps, who hired them out and took their cloth. 
Their terms of contract were generally for five years.8 
On the other hand, due to the fluid situation of the Kasai in the 1890s, even slaves 
appear to have enjoyed some opportunities for social mobility. The same Verner thus 
wrote the following about a trading establishment near Bena Luidi, in the Kuba 
kingdom: 
The ordinary pay of a common labourer is a piece of cotton domestic per 
month, of eight yards to the piece, costing about forty cents to cover the 
cost of transportation; besides about forty cents’ worth of seashells, salt or 
brass wire, the cloth paid by the month, the latter by the week. Some of 
the labourers, astonishing as it may sound, thus actually save means to buy 
slaves, and so a trading factory generally has a contingent of this class 
about it also.9 
 
The CK was established by royal decree on 24 December  1901 and worked to 
amalgamate the fourteen separate trading companies which had been in operation 
in the Kasai since 1886.10 The monopolisation of trade led to a sharp decrease in the 
price paid to the producers of raw rubber: whereas on the free market the Africans 
could expect to receive about three francs per kilogram, the CK was only willing to 
pay five cents for half of a kilogram.11 The close relationship between the State and 
the CK meant that living conditions rapidly deteriorated for the Africans of the Kasai. 
The CK was given the authority to collect the taxes demanded by the State in the 
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9 Ibid., p. 216. 
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areas where no State post existed. This led to the development of a system of 
exploitation which forced the Africans into producing the required rubber. The State 
levy required payment in the form of croisettes,12 which could only be obtained by 
trading rubber (or some of the fast-dwindling ivory of the region) with the CK. In 
order to meet their fiscal obligations towards the State, therefore, Africans had to 
yield rubber.13  
 
The rubber quotas were arbitrary and undetermined, thereby enabling the CK agents 
to demand unprecedented quantities of raw produce.14 In order to ensure 
compliance with these quotas, the CK employed ‘capitas’. Not unlike the Arab-ised 
waungwana , these capitas undertook most of the 'dirty work', acting as 
intermediaries between the State and CK, on the one hand, and chiefs and local 
villagers, on the other. They were responsible for all kinds of abuses, examples of 
which shall be discussed below, making the CK and the CFS capitas instruments of 
local terror. A good number of capitas in the Kasai region were Zappo-Zap; the role 
of capitas must have appeared to be a natural progression from their earlier role of 
suppliers of captive labour to the pre-CK rubber-trading companies. Indeed, 
alongside the collection of taxes, the procurement of slaves seems to have been an 
additional duty. Lapsley, of the APCM at Luebo, revealed that: 
The State forbids slave-holding, but has a provision whereby persons may 
ransom slaves, who then come under the control, 'guardianship,' of the 
ransomed for seven years; then the slave is finally at liberty. There libérés 
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Map 8. 'Compagnie du Kasai Factories', in Daisy S. Martens, 'A History of European Penetration and 
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 (freed men) must be registered as such before the commissaire du district, 
I believe. When the State overpowers a big slave trader, they get a great 
number of slaves, who pass into the seven years' guardianship at once [...] 
The Compagnie has many here; and children are offered (for sale the 
dealers find it) at one, two and three dozen bandannas a head."15 
 
Almost all European agencies in the Kasai and elsewhere in the CFS relied heavily on 
slave labour.  Libérés were enlisted for work on the plantations and the collection of 
rubber, yet missionaries in the Kasai also secured 'liberated' slaves for conversion 
and manual labour on the mission grounds. In 1891, for example, the State entrusted 
Catholic father Cambier with 300 prisoners of war from a raid against a Chokwe 
caravan. These ‘liberated’ slaves were to be accommodated by the Scheutist mission 
at St Joseph-Mikalayi, in the immediate vicinity of Luluabourg.16 Protestant 
missionaries are unlikely not to have benefited from this practice as well. When 
Lapsley first arrived at the mission in Luebo, ‘he began by buying, and so freeing 
slaves. These remained on the station and became “station people” […] and they 
were given work to do’.17 
 
In a similar vein, joining the FP was perceived as being akin to slavery by many 
Congolese. The recruits were to serve five years active service, and then a further 
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two years in reserve, before being 'liberated.'18 Indeed, the generation after the 
famous Zappo-Zap massacre of the Kuba at Pyaang equated the demand for recruits 
for the FP with enslavement: the status of the two was very much the same in their 
eyes.19 This stigma draws clear parallels with the Arab methods of enlistment, as 
shall be explored in greater depth in this next section. 
 
The Force Publique and the ‘Batetela’ 
The Force Publique was the standing army of the CFS, theoretically created for the 
purpose of fulfilling the humanitarian obligations that the Berlin Conference had 
outlined, such as the ending of the slave trade.20 Instituted by royal decree on 5 
August 1888, the FP comprised of a hodgepodge of nationalities. It was not a solely 
Belgian enterprise: alongside the Belgians, in the officer corps of the FP, were also 
drafts from Scandinavia, Italy, England, Switzerland, Germany, Austria and at least 
one officer from Romania.21 European officers were, however, thinly spread in the 
Congo. The 12 State posts in the Lualaba-Kasai district had only 28 European officers 
distributed among them.22 This led to a heavy dependence on African recruits. 
Soldiers were initially recruited in other European colonies in Africa – particularly 
Nigeria and the west coast23 – and among the Bangala. Some Bangala, who 
originated from the area of Mbandaka, in present-day Equateur province, had been 
enlisted by H.M. Stanley for his trans-Africa journey of 1874-1877. These men – and 
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others who chose to adopt the 'Bangala' identity – extended their partnership with 
early European explorers to become the first Congolese soldiers of the FP.24  
 
Bangala aside, the general lack of willing autochthonous Congolese recruits led to 
the issuing of the royal decree of 30 July 1891, which inaugurated the introduction of 
a quota system for the enlistment of local men. The term 'cannibal troops' has often 
been employed with reference  to these recruits of the FP, yet this term is 
misleading, since not all of the native recruits were cannibals or came from regions 
where ritual cannibalism was practiced.25 That is not to say that the indigenous 
soldiers were savoury characters. The task of recruitment was often devolved to 
local chiefs and soon became a method for freeing villages of ‘undesirables’, such as 
rebellious or dangerous subjects, criminals, or slaves.26 Slaves did indeed make up a 
substantial proportion of FP recruits. The bulk of these slave recruits were obtained 
in collusion with State-allied slaving warlords, who gathered potential recruits whilst 
on raiding operations. State agents then bought these slaves for recruitment. On 4 
May 1887, for example, de Macar recorded in his journal that Wissmann's return 
expedition from Nyangwe had bought a quantity of slaves ‘dans le pays de 
cannibales; a Lumpoungou, Zappo-Zap, etc.’27 This was not an isolated occurrence, 
since three years later Gillain noted that ‘Legat vient avec nous pour ramener les 
esclaves libérés que nous comptons acheter à Mpania Mutombo.’28 This system 
eventually morphed into direct 'recruiting' of slaves by the State’s auxiliary troops. 
On 6 August 1902, the Reverend William M. Morrison, of the APCM mission at 
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Luebo, among the Kuba, denounced the following to Deschamps, the then 
commander of Luluabourg. 
Suddenly, without warning or reason, your soldiers commenced running 
through villages, seizing men by force. Some of these men thus caught, you 
took away with you by force, others were released by the soldiers upon the 
payment of the ransom, while others who were too weak to make soldiers 
or workmen were turned loose again. Since you object to the word 'pillage,' 
I will substitute the word 'raiding,' with all that this latter word implies. 
[...] 
I wish still further to state that I have in no way interfered with legitimate 
recruiting, in fact I tried to persuade the chief of Kasenga to secure some of 
his people to go with your officer, and might have succeeded had not your 
officer begun seizing the people by force.29 
 
The majority of the forced recruits, however, originated from the eastern Congo and 
consisted of 'liberated' slaves from intercepted slave caravans and eastern slave-
traders, or prisoners of war from skirmishes.30 Levies from the Uele and Province 
Orientale, traditional Arab-Swahili strongholds, consisted of roughly twice the 
number of recruits from other regions of the Congo. The Lualaba-Kasai also yielded 
significant numbers in 1893-1897, corresponding with the European campaign 
against the Arabs and their later campaigns against Batetela soldiers in the region.31 
It would be tempting to assume that many of the native recruits had been hardened 
by the exposure to the brutalised conditions that plagued their regions of origin; yet 
interviews from the Casement Report of 1903 reveal that some of those in the 
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State’s employment as soldiers did not actually relish the brutal practices of a 
military career, but rather endured them so as ‘to be with the hunters rather than 
the hunted.’32 In an attempt to keep desertions and rebellions down to a minimum, 
FP soldiers were often posted to different districts to those in which they grew up in. 
Verner, for example, ‘saw Baluba soldiers who had been brought from the district’ 
while he was ‘passing through Boma’, near the mouth of the Congo, in March 1904.33 
 
In tandem with regular FP soldiers were auxiliary forces. In the Kasai region, these 
auxiliaries consisted of the armed followings of such slaving warlords as Mpania 
Mutombo, Lumpungu and the Zappo-Zap. Auxiliaries were in theory organised into 
companies and platoons under a superior regular officer of the FP and subject to the 
regulation of the Governor-General.34 Yet, in practice, the auxiliary militia were given 
a free rein within their designated regions, so long as they did not oppose or 
antagonise the state. Indeed the continuity between the CFS and the Arab system 
that had preceded it is striking. Historians such as Roes have commented on this 
parallel, arguing that ‘to organise the profitable extraction of natural resources under 
these circumstances, EIC [État indépendant du Congo] officials resorted to copying 
and adapting the social organisation and terror tactics of the Eastern slave trade.’35 
Continuity was not just a matter of imitation, however, as former Arab conscripts 
and collaborators were directly absorbed into the State militia. In essence, the roles 
of these men had remained the same; what had changed was the identity of their 
employers. This is indeed aptly borne out by the example of the ‘Batetela’. 
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As with many other ethnonyms dating to the early colonial era, the characteristics 
and traits attributed to the term 'Batetela' remain ambiguous, and vary among 
contemporary European commentators.36 Thus it is not immediately clear who the 
Batetela people, in the strict sense of the word, were. Thomas Turner, during his 
field work in the 1970s, detected ‘three or even four meanings of the term “Tetela”, 
in consecutive utterances of Sankuru informants.’37 From the nineteenth century, the 
term ‘Batetela’ was probably less an ethnonym than a general label encompassing 
speakers of the Otetela language, or dialects derived from it.38  This seems to have 
been recognised by anthropologists Emil Torday and M.W.  Hilton-Simpson in  
1908-09: 
The tribes who must be included under the general name of Batetela 
extend over a very large region; from a number of sub-tribes who inhabit 
both banks of the Lubefu adjoining the Basonge, to the others living to the 
north of the Lukenye and adjoining the Akela. The former appear to have 
moved to their present home from the north, the latter from the south-
east.39 
 
Anthropologist Luc de Heusch has further suggested that the term ‘Batetela ‘should 
be placed squarely within the context of the social and political dynamics of the late 
nineteenth century.40 Indeed, from the onset of the ‘Arab Campaign’ in 1892 and the 
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execution of Ngongo Luteta in 1893, the term ‘Batetela’ was often deployed as a 
‘social category’ to describe the indigenous followers of Ngongo and the main 
protagonists of the revolt at Luluabourg in 1895.41 Turner reinforces the ideological 
connotations of the use of the ethnonym Batetela: while the ‘Batetela’ were 
considered rebellious and more wont to savagery, those identified as ‘Songye’ were 
the loyal collaborators of the State.42  
 
There are, in reality, broad similarities between the Batetela and Songye peoples: 
both inhabited the same region of the Congo and both were reported to practice 
cannibalism by contemporary European observers and commentators.  The Batetela 
and Songye were both situated at the intersection of the westward Arab and the 
eastward Luso-African slave and ivory-trading frontiers: indeed geographical 
proximity means that it is likely that a degree of fluidity existed between their 
respective ‘ethnic’ identities and boundaries.43 Both, moreover, suffered the 
devastating consequences of the European campaign against the Arabs in 1892-4.  
 
The presence of Arab-Swahili merchants to the east of their territory strongly 
suggests that the Songye and the Batetela had established significant long-distance 
trading relationship. While the Beekalebue had established contact with Tippu-Tip by 
the 1870s44, Fairley asserts that the Ben’eki were trading with Batetela scouts 
working for the Arabs by the 1880s, acquiring Arab sandals, cloth, and firearms, 
among other items.45 The Zappo-Zap, moreover, are considered to have been the 
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first Ben’eki to procure firearms.46 By this time the Batetela were clearly integrated 
into the Arab politico-economic system as waungwana . The extent of the Batetela 
assimilation into the culture of the Arab merchant-warriors is attested by Dugald 
Campbell, a Plymouth Brethren missionary who served in Katanga, and then 
Northern Rhodesia, from the 1890s. Writing of the Batetela, he remarked that ‘many 
of them spoke Swahili as fluently as they did their own language [...] I found they 
elected to speak Swahili in preference to their own tongue’ in as late as 1922.47  
 
The Batetela stationed at Luluabourg in the mid-1890s were predominantly former 
members of Ngongo Luteta's militia, integrated into the FP after his execution at the 
hands of the State in 1893. Their arrival boosted the numbers of the State posts 
significantly: by the time of the Luluabourg revolt, approximately half of the 87 
soldiers stationed there were Batetela or Manyema men.48 The significant 
contribution of these soldiers to the 1895 rebellion has meant that the latter has 
often been referred to as the ‘Batetela Revolt'. This sweeping generalisation, 
however, confines analysis of the revolt to a racial framework which conceals the 
participation of other ethnic groups. Groups other than the Batetela (however the 
term is construed) joined the mutiny, such as Luba soldiers.49 Furthermore, the 
epithet 'Batetela Revolt' implies that all Batetela in the employment of the State 
joined the rebellion. This was demonstrably not the case. Verner, residing at Luebo, 
testifies that there were Batetela boys who had voluntarily left their homeland in 
order to follow and serve the Batetela warriors who were being incorporated into 
the FP. These boys were considered legal ‘charges of the State’ and were thus 
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‘placed under [the] religious and educational influences’ of surrounding mission 
stations so that they may be taught European ways, later becoming evangelists 
themselves. Whilst the revolt at Luluabourg and the wider regional violence 
triggered by the rebellion were ongoing, ‘the boys at Luebo remained entirely quiet 
and faithful’, according to Verner.50 It is therefore preferable to refer to the rebellion 
as the 'Luluabourg Revolt'. 
 
The Zappo-Zap and the Luluabourg Revolt 
It is important to briefly contextualise the revolt in order to fully understand its 
regional significance. Smaller-scale mutinies by soldiers of the FP had taken place in 
1894 in Lusambo and two other State posts, Kabambare (Manyema) and La Romée 
(Upper Congo). In every case, however, the unsupported rebels had been easily 
quelled by their loyalist peers.51 These revolts must be viewed against a background 
of indigenous unrest in the broader region. To the east of Luluabourg, the European 
campaign against the Arab merchant-warriors had raged for two years, causing 
intense destruction to the lands in the eastern Kasai, which had been one of the 
theatres of violence. There had also been unrest amongst the Kaniok. Captain Pelzer, 
commander of Luluabourg, staged a five-month campaign against them from January 
to June 1895.52 Finally, there was also the ongoing campaign against Kalamba and 
the Bena Lulua, and their Chokwe allies.  
 
A variety of theories have been put forward over the years to account for the 
Luluabourg revolt. The execution of the State’s erstwhile ally Ngongo Luteta in 1893 
is seen by many historians, including Martens and Flament, as well as contemporary 
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commentators such as Michaux, as the ultimate cause of the rebellion on the part of 
his former followers.53 Ngongo's former militia were certainly numerous in the Kasai 
region. By 1895, out of a total of 1,088 regular FP soldiers, almost half were 
'Batetela' who had earlier served under Ngongo.54 However, Boeck argues that it is 
‘absurde d’imaginer que, vingt mois après la mort de leur chef, ils se soient 
brusquement mis en tête de le venger.’55 Instead, Boeck points to the fact that life for 
these mutineers was simply not as good under the Europeans as it had been under 
Ngongo. Militiamen working for either the Arab-Swahili or their proxies had not been 
paid wages, but they had enjoyed the license to freely ‘loot the country all round in 
search of subsistence and slaves.’56  
 
Their military commander Pelzer, was, furthermore,  notoriously cruel and quick to 
inflict harsh punishments for seemingly minor offenses.57 Pelzer  
détestait les noirs, maintes et maintes fois sans motif aucun, il leur flanquait 
de la chicotte. J’ai vu de mes yeux vu frapper les soldats batétélas en pleine 
figure avec la chicotte alors que ces hommes faisaient leur service au plus 
grand contentement de tous les blancs.58  
Indeed, life under the Europeans constrained the Batetela in a way that they had not 
experienced under Ngongo. Feliciano T. Nobre, an Angolan carpenter residing at 
Luluabourg at the time, observed that the Europeans had forced their Batetela 
soldiers to abandon polygamy and take up monogamous relationships, used the 
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chicotte excessively and did not provide sufficient food rations. Supplies were 
distributed roughly fortnightly, yet the rations were not enough to last for more than 
five or six days.59 The relative decline in living standards experienced by Batetela 
warriors must have provided them with a compelling reason to take up arms against 
their new patrons, the European officers of the FP. After all, according to Gillain, the 
event that sparked the revolt was the excessive use of the chicotte against a Batetela 
soldier who had been mistreating a Luba woman.60  
 
The revolt itself began on 4th July 1895 at the garrison of Luluabourg. The Batetela 
fired upon the European officers. The latter allegedly did not realize that this was the 
beginning of a mutiny until Pelzer was killed, since it was commonplace for shots to 
be fired in the air for occasions such as celebrations, or raucous behaviour.61 Lassaux 
and Cassart, the other officers stationed at Luluabourg at that time, went into hiding, 
Lassaux finding shelter at the Zappo-Zap complex, a short distance away. The 
Batetela rebels spent the night at Luluabourg, but then began the trek eastwards in 
the direction of Ngandu, Ngongo's former stronghold. It was here that they engaged 
with loyal State forces from 12 September to 13 October.62 During their journey to 
Ngandu, the rebels were joined by mutinous soldiers from other State posts: Kayeye 
II, Kayeye I and Kabinda. It took the CFS two years to quell the rebellion in the Kasai, 
by which time many of the mutineers had migrated to the bush lands of western 
Katanga, where they could roam and raid in safety from State repercussions until the 
1900s.63 Indeed, the last of the rebels would not be rounded up until 1908. 
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The tumultuous conditions triggered by the mutinies at the State posts enhanced 
Kalamba's longstanding campaign against the CFS and affiliated establishments. By 
7th July 1895, the Batetela who had not travelled eastwards from Luluabourg had 
joined forces with Kalamba, bringing with them the supply of firearms and 
ammunition which they had looted. This development understandably concerned 
the European officers, who feared that the new allies might also join forces with the 
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Some scholars such as Mwana Mputu have presented the Luluabourg revolt as an 
instance of resistance against the colonial takeover.65 This misleading interpretation 
is predicated on the simplistic view that colonialism in Africa amounted to a clear-cut 
confrontation between European colonisers and autochthonous peoples. When 
viewed in the light of the historical processes discussed so far, the Luluabourg revolt 
was less an anti-colonial rebellion, or an act of ‘primary resistance’,66 than the swan 
song of the late nineteenth-century warlord order that had taken roots in the 
eastern Congo; such was the political model and way of life to which the mutineers 
aspired to return. Even though – as has been argued above – ‘tribal’ readings of the 
revolt are potentially misleading, it is nonetheless incontestable that by 1895 a 
significant proportion of the regular FP troops in the Lualaba-Kasai district were 
Batetela, in the sense that they had either been former followers of Ngongo or other 
Afro-Arab agents, or that they hailed from Manyema, the recently conquered Arab 
stronghold.67 The mutiny of the Batetela, then, was likely a movement to revert back 
to the warlord conditions that the slave and ivory traders had brought into being 
(and that the Europeans themselves were prepared to tolerate and make use of in 
select instances). In other words, far from being anti-colonial heroes, the rebels 
harked back to the era of raiding and pillaging on their own terms, and not on the 
terms of the State. Medical officer Sidney Hinde observed that the rebellion of 
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Ngongo's former followers was motivated by their anger at seeing ‘their power being 
broken’ at Ngongo's former stronghold since his execution.68 In a similar vein, Vellut 
once suggested that the revolt might be helpfully understood, not as an instance of 
resistance to the State, but rather as a series of ‘luttes intestines entre 
conquérants…’69  
 
The military prowess of the Zappo-Zap came as a blessing to the State during the 
revolt. The records of State officers are littered with references to the Zappo-Zap and 
the military lifeline they provided in the immediate aftermath of the outbreak of the 
revolt. One of the reported military clashes with the rebels, Kalamba’s men in this 
instance, took place at the Scheutist mission of St Joseph-Mikalayi on 18 July 1895. 
On this occasion, the Zappo-Zap saved the life of Cambier and protected the African 
inhabitants of the mission, estimated at 1,100 by the end of 1894.70 Kalamba was 
defeated at Luluabourg; yet by 27 July, he had still not given up or disarmed, and so 
Cassart was sent with a  
contingent of Zappo-Zap militia to confront him.71 Kalamba retreated north-
eastwards towards Luebo. Thereafter, the Zappo-Zap were instructed to follow and 
ambush the insurgents along the path.72  
 
The Zappo-Zap loyalty to the State, alongside that of the majority of Luba soldiers, 
never seems to have wavered during the course of the revolt. This was widely 
acknowledged by European officers. Writing to Gillain in August 1895, Cassart 
stressed that while the situation in Luluabourg might soon improve, he had 
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nonetheless been very lucky to have had the Zappo-Zap on hand during the early 
stages of the revolt.73 As has been earlier established, the main body of the Zappo-
Zap populace resided in the immediate vicinity of Luluabourg, at a mere twenty 
minutes’ walking distance from the CFS station.74 After the initial shots were fired, 
Lassaux sought refuge in the village of the Zappo-Zap, who protected his life against 
the mutineers who were inquiring after his whereabouts. According to Flament, a 
gift of guns and cloth was given to the Zappo-Zap by the State as a reward for 
sending the rebels away without relinquishing Lassaux.75 However, Cassart's letter to 
Gillain on 1st August 1895 suggests that it had been the Batetela who had offered the 
Zappo-Zap ivory and cloth in an attempt to induce them to join the rebellion. The 
leader of this Zappo-Zap contingent is reported to have shunned this opportunity 
and to have answered that, as long as he lived, the rebels would not have Lassaux.76 
Another (warped) version of the event appears in Demetrius Boulger's work 
published three years after the event: this time, it is the wounded Cassart that the 
Zappo-Zap refuse to hand over to the mutineers.77 
 
The deviations notwithstanding, these accounts bear out the clear alignment of the 
Zappo-Zap with the State. This begs the obvious question: why did the Zappo-Zap not 
join the revolt at its outset? To express this more pointedly: if – as has been argued – 
the revolt was inspired by the ambition to return  to the late nineteenth-century 
warlord order, why did the Zappo-Zap – who, after all, were the products of the 
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Arab-dominated long distance trade network – choose to consort with the 
Europeans rather than seeking to revive their previous marauder identity? 
 
One possible explanation is that they did not fully realise the scale of the rebellion. 
They may have been under the impression that the uprising in Luluabourg was 
nothing more than a minor insular rebellion, unlikely to seriously threaten the 
authority of their European partners. Moreover, European officers seem to have 
worked hard to disguise the true extent of the mutiny from their local allies. This was 
certainly the policy adopted in Katanga. For example, on 6 June 1897, while Captain 
Brasseur was on Lake Mweru (on the border between present-day Democratic 
Republic of Congo and Zambia), he received a letter from the Commissaire de District 
Maréchal, then at MTowa, on Lake Tanganyika. Reproduced by Brasseur in his 
diary, Maréchal's letter reads as follows: 
8 Mai. Le Commissaire de District me communique la grave nouvelle de la 
révolte des Batétélas de l’expédition de l’Inspecteur [Dhanis]. La sédition, au 
sujet de laquelle les renseignements précis font défaut, a éclaté vers le 
commencement de mars [1897], au 2e de lat N et au 30e de longitude Est. 
Le Commissaire de District croit que les révoltés, s’ils ne peuvent être 
arrêtés par l’Inspecteur, chercheront probablement  à regagner leur pays 
d’origine, en se dirigeant sur Kirundu ou plus à l’Est ; il recommande à nous 
tous de nous tenir sur nos gardes contre les surprises et de mettre armes et 
munitions en sûreté. La plus grande discrétion est de rigueur afin que les 
évènements qui se passent dans le N n’aient pas leur contrecoup dans la 
zone.  Aucun noir ne doit connaître la nouvelle.78 
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On the other hand, there are signs that the Zappo-Zap did grasp the extent of 
regional tensions. In a note to Gillain, dating to only two days after the initial 
outbreak of the revolt in 1895, Michaux certifies that the Zappo-Zap knew – and had 
even warned – the Europeans of an impending revolt at the State post of 
Mukabwe.79 Mukabwe had been established to keep an eye on Kalamba since the 
beginning of the confrontation between the State and his Bena Lulua. It lay at a 
distance of 80km, to the south west of Luluabourg.80 Thus, the Zappo-Zap were 
aware of the unrest among FP soldiers, at least to the west of Luluabourg.  
 
An alternative explanation might point to the identity of the Batetela soldiers 
stationed at Luluabourg. Consisting largely of former followers of the late Ngongo 
Luteta, it is possible that these same soldiers had in the past participated in – or were 
viewed as being responsible for – the man-hunt that had driven Nsapu-Nsapu and his 
men away from their Ben’eki homeland. If this was indeed the case, then the Zappo-
Zap had little reason to abandon their new European allies in favour of their former 
enemies. On the other hand, the continuing enmity between Arab-ised warlords and 
their followers ought perhaps not to be overemphasized. Writing to Gillain on 
12thJuly 1895, Michaux suggested that the best way to tackle the Batetela alliance 
with Kalamba was to deploy Mpania Mutombo and his men in the same western 
arena of fighting as the Zappo-Zap.81 Had the two groups still been intensely hostile 
to one another, placing them within the same battleground would have risked the 
intensification of violence.82  
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The warlords Lumpungu and Mpania Mutombo themselves did not throw their 
weight behind the rebellion either, and remained loyal to the State. These 
mercenaries, like the Zappo-Zap, had been incorporated into the CFS military 
structure as auxiliaries. They largely retained their own followers and were 
presented with regions formerly belonging to the Luba Lubilanji of the eastern Kasai 
to rule over – Lumpungu the southern region and Mpania the northern region – in 
tandem with CFS expectations.83  The Zappo-Zap probably enjoyed similar privileges. 
On 9 January 1895, six months prior to the outbreak of the revolt, Gillain noted in his 
personal diary that he had visited the Zappo-Zap in Luluabourg to scold them for not 
having gathered enough tribute from their ‘sujets’ there.84 Furthermore, it is likely 
that the State turned a blind eye (or even encouraged) the Zappo-Zap’s continuing 
slave-trading activities, as it did in the cases of Lumpungu and Mpania Mutombo. 
Verner, for instance, lamented that ‘where […] the chief dealers in human beings 
were the strongest professed allies the government possessed, as in the case of the 
Zappo-Zaps, the officials at Lusambo and Luluabourg experienced troubles well-nigh 
insurmountable in putting down the trade.’85 It is even possible that new slaving 
frontiers were thrown open to the Zappo-Zap thanks to their alliance with the CFS: 
the personal testimony of a liberated Batetela slave, as collected by Verner, suggests 
that ‘the Zappo-Zaps had followed in the wake of the white man in his country.’86  
Slaves were not the only end-product of State-sanctioned raids: whilst on tribute-
collecting missions on behalf of the State, the Zappo-Zap were permitted to ‘plunder, 
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burn, and kill for their own amusement and gain.’87  It thus seems clear that the 
auxiliary troops of the CFS enjoyed greater independence, room for manoeuvre and 
opportunities for self-enrichment than their peers who were directly incorporated 
into the FP as regular soldiers. This being the case, they are likely to have had less 
grounds for discontent and, therefore, rebellion.  
 
The Kuba and the Pyaang Massacre 
The Kuba kingdom did not consist of a homogenous ‘Kuba’ ethnic group; rather, it 
encompassed a collection of communities, loosely united as the ‘people of the 
king.’88 The King, or Lukengu, hailed from the Bushoong ethnic group at the heart of 
the kingdom. The polity was informed by notions of divine kingship akin to those 
which existed in the Luba empire. Nonetheless, there was a strong ‘democratic’ 
undercurrent to Kuba governance which was not found in other polities in the Kasai 
and surrounding districts. The King’s council, for instance, consisted of titleholders 
who had been elected to their offices by their peers.89 Peripheral ethnic groups, 
however, were less closely integrated into the kingdom, although there were 
institutions, such as the taking up of royal wives by the Lukengu, which tied them to 
the royal capital.90 The Kete, in particular, thought to have been the original 
inhabitants of the land until they were conquered by the Bushoong and subjected to 
their rule, were estranged from the ruling elite. These internal divisions were 
exploited by early CFS agents. An initial Kuba attack on Bateman while undertaking a 
reconnaissance of the Lulua river in 1886 led him to tell  ‘the Bakete that they must 
choose whom they would befriend […] if [...] they desired to be free from an ancient 
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thraldom, and to cast their lot with us, I was willing to undertake their defence 
against the Bakuba.’91 Although the Kuba kingdom did not lack military strength and 
had indeed been able to protect its middleman position in the 1880s to the 
detriment of Luso-African traders from Angola,92 internal fragmentation weighed 
against its ability to present a united front against the Europeans and their local 
allies. The Bushoong – as will be seen in the case of the Pyaang – refused to militarily 
defend the peripheral chiefdoms of uncertain loyalty.93   
  
It is probable that the Zappo-Zap and the Kuba people had been in trading contact 
before the Zappo-Zap moved to Luluabourg and stipulated their alliance with the 
CFS. The Kuba people, the history of whom has been well documented by Jan 
Vansina,94 were a slave importing society: slaves were utilised for domestic labour 
and the expansion of kin groups. These imported slaves were predominantly Luba-
speakers of the eastern Kasai, who had been raided by the Zappo-Zap and other 
marauders.95 However, Vansina also asserts that the Kuba acquired the majority of 
their slave population from these slave traders in the early colonial period and not 
before the arrival of the State, despite the ‘civilising’ claims of the CFS to quash the 
slave trade.96 The slave markets were largely based on the periphery of the Kuba 
kingdom: it was difficult for foreigners to penetrate the interior of the kingdom itself. 
The Kuba had traditionally conducted an isolationist policy and shunned foreign 
encroachment, preventing outsiders from entering the royal capital on pain of death. 
This policy was enforced even when Kuba subjects inadvertently came across 
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‘foreigners who had dared overstep Lukengu’s laws and enter the forbidden bounds 
of his kingdom’. The Kuba ‘traitors’ were then summoned to the royal capital and a 
‘bloody death’ administered to them.97  
 
However, the increase in Kuba slaves was such that by 1892, there was at least one 
slave per household within the royal capital.98 This dramatic increment in slaves also 
coincided with the introduction of amulets and charms into Kuba society from slave-
trading peoples such as the Zappo-Zap and the Chokwe.99 This would seem, on the 
surface, to suggest a level of cultural borrowing and spiritual assimilation between 
such communities. In spite of this, however, there seems to have been little love lost 
between the Zappo-Zap and the Kuba. The Kuba had formerly insulted their chief, 
and the Zappo-Zap considered themselves ‘ennemis-nés des Bakubas’.100 The Zappo-
Zap assault on Kuba subjects at Pyaang in September 1899 is also described by the 
eyewitness William Sheppard as an act of ‘revenge’ for ‘an old feud which had begun 
long ago between the Zaps and Lukengu’. Sheppard, unfortunately, does not make 
clear how this feud may have begun.101 
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The State-sanctioned actions of the Zappo-Zap against the Kuba may have thus 
offered the former the opportunity to exact their retribution. The Pyaang offensive 
was actually only one of the three attacks which culminated in the State’s conquest 
of the kingdom: a raid against the capital in April 1899, the onslaught at Pyaang in 
September of the same year, and the eventual overrunning of the capital in late July 
1900, after the death of the King.102 These attacks occurred against a background of 
political instability and volatility within the Kuba kingdom, which had witnessed the 
slow infiltration of ‘non-Kuba’ peoples from the south and attempts at secession 
from the subjects in the east of the kingdom.103 
                                                             
102 Vansina, Being Colonized, p69-70; Jan Vansina, ‘Comment l'histoire se Construit : la 
Conquête du Royaume Kuba (1899-1900)’, Civilisations, Volume 40, No. 2, (1992), p. 43. 
103 Claes Josefsson, ‘An Outpost of Progress: Development in the Northern Kasai Region of 
Zaire in the Early 20th Century’, Ethnos, Volume 49, Issue 3-4, (1985). 
Map 10. 'The Kuba Kingdom, 1885', in Jan Vansina, Being Colonized: The Kuba Experience in Rural 
Congo, 1880-1960 (University of Wisconsin Press: Madison; Wisconsin, 2010), p. 45. 




Furthermore, different royal factions had been locked in competition from 1885, 
creating the opportune circumstances for State conquest and exploitation.104 Indeed 
Rev. C. de Witt Snyder, a Protestant missionary based at Luebo, foretold State 
intervention in the midst of the dissension. The Kuba king, he wrote, ‘is old and liable 
to die any day. When he dies I think the kingdom will end as the state will step in and 
put a stop to any succeeding king.’105 The in-fighting among Bushoong royalty was 
further exacerbated by the intervention of APCM missionaries, who took 
Mishaamilyeng, an heir to the Lukengu title, under their protection. This action, 
while seemingly humanitarian, most likely prolonged the political turmoil: Mishaape, 
the new king, was under constant threat of being overthrown by this contender to 
the throne. Eventually, Mishaape died in July 1900 before he was acknowledged as 
the legitimate King, having failed to eliminate his rivals.106 
 
Combining the different perspectives of oral and written sources, Vansina has fully 
reconstructed the fall of the Kuba kingdom to the State in 1900.107 However, it is the 
September 1899 offensive against the Pyaang, a community on the eastern 
periphery of the Kuba state, between the Livelo and the Lubudi rivers, which best 
serves to illustrate the alliance between the Zappo-Zap and the CFS. The Pyaang 
Massacre has been made infamous by missionary reports which, in the hands of 
early human rights activists such as E.D. Morel and H.R. Fox Bourne, provided 
powerful evidence of the brutality of the workings of the CFS.108 The full account of 
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the events at Pyaang was authored by the American Presbyterian missionary, Mr. 
William Morrison. Morrison, who was based at the mission of Luebo, drew on the 
testimony of his colleague William Sheppard, who had been an eyewitness to the 
immediate aftermath of the violence. Sheppard had been alerted to Zappo-Zap 
raiding activities in an area ‘a few hours’ walk of their station at [...] Ibanche’.109 A 
total of fourteen villages in this region had been subject to a scorched earth policy, 
and so Sheppard embarked on an exploratory mission to establish the situation on 
the ground, meeting and conferring with M'lumba Nkusa.110 M'lumba Nkusa was the 
Zappo-Zap chief who had led the raiding party: he was not the paramount of the 
Zappo-Zap militia, but a subordinate ally to the successors of Nsapu-Nsapu.111 
 
Sheppard's interview with M'lumba Nkusa reveals that the Zappo-Zap had ventured 
into Pyaang territory in order to gather tribute for the State. To this end, they had 
invited between 80 and 90 neighbouring chiefs and sub-chiefs into the stockade they 
had created. However, after they ‘only’ yielded ‘eight slaves, two points of ivory, 
2,500 balls of rubber, a few goats and fowls, and some corn and chumby’, all of the 
visitors within the stockade were killed.112 While the scale of the killing was certainly 
enough to warrant missionary outrage, the reported post-mortem brutalities proved 
even more shocking, sparking a veritable moral hysteria and lending weight to the 
campaign against King Leopold and the CFS.  Sheppard asserts that he saw only forty-
one bodies within the compound: only half of the chiefs that M'lumba Nkusa is said 
to have lured in from Pyaang. The others, according to Nkusa, had been eaten by his 
men.113 This may not have come as a great surprise to Sheppard, who had 
                                                             
109 Bourne, Civilisation in Congoland, p. 258. 
110 Ibid.; 'Massacre in Congo State’, 5 January 1900.  
111
 Vansina, Being Colonized, p. 27. 
112 Bourne, Civilisation in Congoland,  p. 259-60. 
113 Ibid., p. 260. 
MUTINIES AND MUTILATIONS 
115 
 
characterised the Zappo-Zap as ‘ruthless and dangerous cannibals’ in his personal 
correspondence and public speeches.114 It was, however, the eighty-one hands being 
roasted for preservation that seemed to attract the greatest moral revulsion. This 
was probably because M'lumba Nkusa's explanation for this practice directly 
implicated the State. On this score, Nkusa declared that ‘they always cut off the right 
hand to give it to the State on their return.’115 This, Sheppard understood, was a 
barbarous method through which CFS authorities ensured that gun cartridges were 
not wasted indiscriminately against the natives; the hand was to be cut off the 
corpse posthumously to prove the kill.116 
 
The evidence collected by Sheppard was significant, as it demonstrated the existence 
of an institutional framework that explicitly encouraged  violence as a means to 
harvest the maximum amount of resources and tribute. Such violence, in other 
words, was far from being a mere act of ‘savage barbarianism’ on the part of the 
Zappo-Zap. These terror tactics run parallel with those that had obtained under Arab 
rule. Indeed, similar to the waungwana  under the Arab system, the Zappo-Zap 
materially gained from the violence: they were given free rein to ‘plunder’ the 
villages after extracting State taxes.117 
 
At this point, mention must be made of the fact that the sources on the Pyaang 
Massacre are far from unequivocal. The APCM account summarized above clearly 
implicates the State as the authority behind the attack. Cambier, on the other hand, 
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attempted to absolve the State, claiming that it had never employed the Zappo-Zap 
as tax collectors (although he admitted that they could be prone to misguidedly 
using their power and authority for their own benefit) and that it was the Zappo-Zap 
who had come under attack in Pyaang country.118 Cambier was being economical 
with the truth here. As has been previously argued, State auxiliary troops were often 
used as capitas and tax collectors. Even as late as the late 1900s, highly placed 
European officers defended the Zappo-Zap right to claim large number of local slaves 
for State use, and escorted them in this endeavour. For example, early in 1908, the 
APCM at Luebo had ‘not [for] the first time [...] been disturbed by the officers of the 
State coming here from Luluabourg and threatening to take the people away and 
force them to become slaves of the Zappo-Zaps again.’119 Cambier, moreover, had 
not been present in the Congo at the time of the Pyaang attack. Finally, he was also, 
as we know, personally indebted to the Zappo-Zap since their defence of St Joseph-
Mikalayi station only four years earlier. Cambier's rendition of the attack, then, does 
not hold in the face of the historical evidence.   
 
This, however, is not to say that the narrative of exploitation propagated by the 
American Presbyterian missionaries should be swallowed unconditionally. There is 
certainly a sense that the evidence they presented was deployed for political 
purposes. The practice of dismembering hands, for example, was described as having 
been introduced by the CFS, and it became an international symbol of the 
unparalleled savagery that Leopoldian colonialism cultivated. Morel, for one, felt 
entitled to conclusively assert that while 
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I have read, I think, nearly all that is to be read of Congo literature, and, 
eliminating the recent bald official statements - statements unsupported by 
a shadow of proof - I have come across nothing which tends to show, or 
even to suggest, that the native tribes of the Congo territories mutilate 
their enemies either dead or living.120  
Yet, it seems that this practice – or similar examples – predated the CFS. The English 
explorer Verney Lovett Cameron, writing of his experience among the Luba of 
Katanga in June 1875, recorded, for example, that at the mention of the name of the 
Luba Mulopwe, ‘there was immediately much lively pantomimic action as of cutting 
off ears, noses, and hands, and all [villagers] declared that on his approach they 
would secrete themselves in the jungle.’121  The historically untenable notion that 
mutilations were introduced by the State is both a cause and a consequence of an 
intellectual climate that, since the days of the Congo Reform Association, has 
distorted the structure and workings of the CFS. In this simplistic reading, rubber-
hungry Europeans, led by an evil, greedy king, inflicted untold misery on innocent 
Africans. An extract from a letter from Morrison to the Aborigines Protection Society 
aptly exemplifies this intellectual standpoint: 
The fact is that the petty officers who personally do all this 'dirty work' are 
not really the guilty ones after all so much as are the high officials, and most 
prominent among these latter, of course, is none other than Leopold II, the 
professed philanthropist.122   
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Readings such as these tend to present Leopold as the actor solely responsible for 
the acts of violence that punctuated life in the CFS. For instance, in the words of 
Slade, ‘research has shown again and again that it was the King’s will alone which 
shaped his Congo policy; that he was a constitutional monarch in Europe, and was 
also an absolute despot in the Congo.’123 This take – most recently regurgitated in 
works such as King Leopold's Ghost124 – divests the CFS’s African agents, such as the 
Zappo-Zap, of their historical responsibilities – responsibilities which were, ironically, 
acknowledged by State officers of the time. Indeed, it is revealed in the inquiry into 
the Zappo-Zap killings at Pyaang that the governor-general ‘établi à la charge des 
gens de cette tribu une certaine part de culpabilité dans les faits qui se sont passés 
dans la région’ of the Kuba.125 The subsequent warping of events have underplayed 
the importance of the late nineteenth-century global trade in transforming and 
brutalizing the socio-political landscape of the southern savanna, before any direct 
European encroachment.   
 
What is needed, in other words, is to form an accurate picture of the real balance of 
power in the State. The study of the historical trajectory of the Zappo-Zap goes some 
way towards making this objective possible. The Zappo-Zap were a valuable ally to 
the State, as their loyalty during the 1895 rebellion had shown. As such, M’lumba 
Nkusa was imprisoned for merely weeks as punishment for the killings at Pyaang: a 
distinctly mild penalty, calculated to appease the critics of the regime. The State – 
and missionaries such as Cambier – owed much to the Zappo-Zap because of the 
recent revolt. Furthermore, the number of Zappo-Zap exceeded that of State forces, 
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and it is unlikely that the State could have long survived a Zappo-Zap insurrection in 
the midst of the other coeval insurgencies.126  Even the short imprisonment of Nkusa, 
however, allegedly threatened the loyalty of the Zappo-Zap. Outraged at having been 
‘treacherously dealt with’ by the State, the Zappo-Zap were rumoured to be ‘on the 
eve of revolting’ in the weeks after the sentencing of Nkusa. Had the threat 
materialized, it would have been ‘a most serious affair, seeing that their number is 
estimated at about 25,000 or 30,000, and that they have many guns, and know from 
long experience how to use them.’127 
 
Zappo-Zap Loyalty to the State 
Fortunately for the State, a Zappo-Zap rebellion did not materialise,, even though the 
Kuba rebellion of 1904 sparked renewed fears of Zappo-Zap infidelity. The course of 
the rebellion itself is not of importance in this context,128 but the fetishes and 
bwanga (magic) employed are. In 1903, the Kuba had sent for a Zappo-Zap shaman 
to expel the small pox epidemic rife in the kingdom, the logic being that the Zappo-
Zap, having defeated the Kuba, possessed greater spiritual power than the latter.129 
These ‘magic men’ stayed within the kingdom and lent assistance with the 
contrivance of the ‘Tonga-Tonga’ cult, which originated from a village near Bena 
Dibele in April or May of 1904.130 The Tonga-Tonga bwanga was believed to provide 
immunity from European bullets. It thus incited open rebellion against the State and 
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the rejection of European culture and, more specifically, the enforced State dues 
demanded by the Compagnie du Kasaï.131  
 
The presence of Zappo-Zap shaman within the region and their direct influence on 
Kuba spiritual practices posed the tangible threat of the Zappo-Zap population 
joining the rebellion alongside the Kuba. It is unclear, however, how much of a risk 
the Zappo-Zap mercenaries posed to the State in the context of the Kuba rebellion. 
According to Fairley's collection of oral histories, the Babanga sub-sect of the 
Ben’eki, from which the Zappo-Zap originated, never spoke highly of traditional 
Bukishi spiritual practices; that is to say that the extent to which  Zappo-Zap militias 
adhered to traditional fetishes and magical practices is unclear.132 On the other hand, 
scholars such Shaloff, backed by Josefsson, have hinted at the possibility that the 
Zappo-Zap were themselves the instigators of the Kuba rebellion.133 Drawing upon 
Torday as evidence, these scholars took at face value the following remarks of the 
anthropologist: 
I know on the best authority that he [Zappo-Zapp, chief of the Zappo-Zap 
people] was responsible for the rising of the Bushongo; when he saw that it 
would be unsuccessful he turned against them, and his brigands committed 
most of the depredations attributed to the Bushongo134. 
This allegation of infidelity seems unfounded, however. Not only did Torday not 
reveal the identity of his mysterious source, but the reliability of his information on 
the Zappo-Zap is further thrown into question by the glaring error he makes on the 
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very same page: Torday mistakenly describes the former Zappo-Zap chief, Nsapu-
Nsapu, as having been a headman of warlord Mpania Mutombo.135  It seems, then, 
that it is safe to dismiss his reading of the rebellion.  
 
Indeed, during the following years, the Zappo-Zap continued to benefit from their 
cooperation with the CFS. In February 1908, the Luebo chef de secteur escorted a 
band of Zappo-Zap in a mission to reclaim alleged runaway slaves ‘and force them to 
become slaves of the Zappo-Zaps again.’136 In this case, the Zappo-Zap were 
unsuccessful, but this example – and the detailed material surveyed above – clearly 
demonstrate that ample opportunities were available to the Zappo-Zap to acquire 
power and status under the governance of the CFS. The State’s reliance on the 
Zappo-Zap was such that an unspecified missionary described them tout court as ‘a 
tribe kept by the State for its protection.’137 
The CFS needed indigenous military backing, and this gave the Zappo-Zap plenty of 
leeway. Their motives and enduring loyalty to the State are unintelligible unless this 
fundamental consideration is borne in mind. 
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There are clear conclusions to be drawn from this study. As the history of the Kasai 
shows, the abuses and brutalities traditionally associated with the CFS were real 
enough. They represented, however, the intensification and systematization of pre-
existing extractive practices dating back to the era of the long-distance trade and the 
related emergence of warlordism. Exception made for the leading coastal traders, 
whom the CFS did eliminate from the Congolese scene, the indigenous protagonists 
of this era of enhanced, market-driven violence found a new lease of life under the 
aegis of the State. As the case of the Zappo-Zap bears out, the ‘new men’ who had 
based their power and prestige on the ability to acquire firearms and participate in 
the slave and ivory trades were more readily co-opted into the structures of the CFS 
than excluded from them. The real losers were ‘traditional’ African societies, such as 
the Kuba, and the patterns of ‘soft’ governance that had been typical of the southern 
savanna before its direct incorporation into long-distance trade networks over the 
course of the nineteenth-century. The study of the Zappo-Zap attests to the 
adaptability of these ‘new men’. Originally at least partially Arab-ised by their 
exposure to the Arab-Swahili trade, the Zappo-Zap quickly moulded their identity to 
enhance their assimilation into the framework of the State - to the detriment of 
former State allies, such as Kalamba. The loyalty of the Zappo-Zap was assured in the 
face of multiple attempts by regional groups to topple European authority: the 
Chokwe, later joined by Kalamba, clashed repeatedly with the State; the Kaniok, too, 
were active dissidents;  soldiers of the FP mutinied in 1895; the Kuba rebelled in 
1904. The Zappo-Zap, thus, serve as a key example of African agency and 





They are proof of the adaptability and versatility of African agents: aligning 
themselves with whosoever would proffer the greatest benefits and advantages, 
much to the detriment of those groups which the Zappo-Zap lorded over.  
 
In conclusion, it is in order to stress the provisional character of this dissertation and 
the areas of investigation that would repay close study in the future. Thus, in the 
absence of ad hoc oral investigations, this dissertation has not attempted to explore 
the political trajectory of the Zappo-Zap in the aftermath of the Pyaang Massacre 
and the Kuba rebellion. Tentatively, it would appear that the publicity gained by the 
Pyaang killings was such that even the CFS could not afford to ignore it. It thus 
resulted in the Zappo-Zap being brought under closer control and their military role 
diminished.398 A worthy future research endeavour would be to chart the wane of 
the Zappo-Zap, in contrast to the fortunes of, for example, the Luba, another 
transplanted ethnic group who forged an enduring loyalty to the State, but did not 
suffer from similarly ‘bad publicity’. 
 
Being concerned with the violent early history of the Congo Free State, this 
dissertation has naturally highlighted the military dimension of the Zappo-Zap 
identity; yet it can be safely surmised that other economic factors and cultural 
symbols were at work, and that not all Zappo-Zap regarded warfare as their exclusive 
vocation. One of the limitations of this dissertation is that it has only focused on the 
Zappo-Zap residing in Luluabourg. However, while Luluabourg was indeed their 
‘principal settlement in the Kasai district […], a good many of them had made smaller 
settlements near the most important centres, at Lusambo on the Sankuru, at Luebo, 
                                                             





at Bena Makima and […] at the Bakete town of Kabau.’399 Without further research, it 
is difficult to establish whether there were significant cultural differences between 
these various Zappo-Zap communities. An initial look at the scattered evidence 
suggests that this might actually have been the case. The American missionary 
Verner, for instance, hinted at the presence of specialized artisans and traders 
among the Zappo-Zap of Luebo.400 The metalwork and carpentry skills of the Zappo-
Zap were highly praised by other Europeans.401 These competencies appear to have 
enabled at least some of the Zappo-Zap to abandon the slave trade in favour of more 
‘legitimate’ commercial pursuits, as ‘hoes made by the Zappo blacksmiths’ were 
exchanged in the Kasai alongside ‘rubber, ivory, copper, native produce and 
provisions […] and goods obtained from Europeans.”402  
 
Another significant omission is that, while this dissertation has drawn on missionary 
sources, it has not actually explored the impact of both Catholic and Protestant 
missionaries on the peoples of the Kasai, in general, and the Zappo-Zap, in particular. 
There were certainly members of the Zappo-Zap who settled at mission stations in 
the Kasai, and the existence is known of at least one Zappo-Zap Catholic catechist in 
1911.403 In the absence of further research, it is impossible to say more about the 
importance of Zappo-Zap conversion and the extent to which they underwent a 
process of ‘Europeanization’ similar to that which the Luba converts famously 
experienced.404 
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Because of the limitations of our sources, the history and identity of Zappo-Zap 
women has similarly not been heeded. As such, it is difficult to confirm whether 
Zappo-Zap women were assimilated into European society on par with the men. The 
wives and concubines of regular FP soldiers accompanied their male partners to their 
postings and were regarded as being under military authority.405 It is unclear 
whether this was also the case for such auxiliary troops as the Zappo-Zap. The only 
seemingly certifiable reference to a Zappo-Zap woman pertains to Chala, the wife 
Monsieur Stache, whose trading company, the SAB, had been present in Luebo from 
1884/5.406 Chala – described as a Zappo-Zap ‘princess’ – had converted to Christianity 
after settling at Luebo and, in all likelihood, had close contacts with the APCM 
stationed there: she and her husband placed their daughter, Emma, under the care 
of Mr and Mrs Sheppard on the mission.407 Further, the marriage was reported to 
have prompted a number of Zappo-Zap to settle at Luebo as traders.408 Once more, 
only further research might establish how typical was the experience of Chala and 
whether other Zappo-Zap women followed her example -and that of their male 
peers- in making the most of the new opportunities thrown open by the arrival of the 
Europeans.  
                                                             
405 Boeck, Les Révoltes de la Force Publique, p. 45. 
406
 Verner, Pioneering in Central Africa, p. 101-4. 
407 Ibid, 
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